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ABSTRACT
The recent changes in the electric utility industry due to the deregulation of the 
industry have created an immense need for the evaluation o f all the services provided. 
The electric utility companies all across the United States have been providing these 
services for a long period o f  time. However, under the light o f  current deregulation, each 
one o f these services have to identified and evaluated separately. This thesis discusses 
three of these services, including security of the power system operation (Spinning and 
operating reserves). Automatic Generation Control (Load Following) and reactive power 
support. These three services are vital in operation of any power system. There is a lot o f 
research currently being done to evaluate the cost of providing these services. The thesis 
makes an attempt to recognize the importance of these services and uses the system 
dispatch and unit commitment theory and principles to evaluate the cost of each of the 
above mentioned services.
VI
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CHAPTER 1: 
INTRODUCTION
The electric power industry is today an industry in transition. In response to 
changes in the law, technology, and markets, competitive pressures are steadily building 
in the industry. Once the primary domain of large, vertically integrated utilities providing 
power at regulated rates, the industry now includes companies selling "un-bundled" 
power at rates set by competitive markets. These more competitive markets are market 
based instead of cost based. That brings some very interesting issues regarding recovery 
of the stranded investments. New generating facilities are being built at costs well below 
the average costs o f some vertically integrated utilities. In this environment, more 
competition will mean lower rates for wholesale customers.
The intention o f Federal Energy Regulation Commission (FERC) is to encourage 
lower electricity rates by structuring an orderly transition to competitive bulk power 
markets [2]. Increased competition will result in lower rates. To facilitate this transition, a 
measured transition from regulated to competitive markets is absolutely essential.
Moving to competitive generation markets will fundamentally change long­
standing regulatory relationships. Utilities have invested billions of dollars in order to 
meet their obligations. Those investments have been made under a "regulatory compact" 
whereby utilities — and their shareholders — expect to recover prudently incurred costs. 
With the advent o f competition, even prudent investments may become stranded.
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Reliance on past contractual and regulatory practices must be recognized and past 
investments must be protected to assure an orderly, fair transition to competition.
The focus of the "Notice o f  Proposed Rulemaking" (NOPR - Also known as 
Mega-NOPR due to the magnitude o f its impacts) is to facilitate competitive wholesale 
electric power markets [2]. The key to competitive bulk power markets is opening up 
transmission services and determining what is the actual value o f a “Megawatt”. It also 
includes determining what goes into generating a “Megawatt” and then transmitting it to 
the customer. At this crossroad for the industry, it is critical to take the regulator)' steps 
now to facilitate the transition to competitive bulk power markets in an orderly manner.
FERC made it clear the importance o f determining the costs o f ancillary services. 
These costs need to calculated and recovered from the potential customers o f  electricity. 
FERC also made it very clear that since rate-payers will be paying for all these services, it 
is very important to determine the values of the ancillary services as accurately as 
possible.
The transmission of electricity from one point to another will include some 
transmission losses. It will also require some Reactive Power support throughout the 
transmission path. Such costs need to be built into the tariffs that the transmission 
company should charge its customers to receive the accurate compensation o f its services.
To move to a fair competition it was important for every public utility to price 
separately all wholesale generation and transmission services (including ancillary 
services) and take wholesale transmission service under its own tariff, i.e., "functionally 
un-bundle" its wholesale generation and transmission services. The proposed rule does
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not mandate the corporate separation o f generation, transmission, and distribution 
functions. However, it makes it essential for the utilit>- companies to determine each of 
the costs separately in order to charge it customers for the use of any services [2].
FERC has defined a number o f services that can be interpreted as ancillary 
services. These services will be discussed in detail in later chapters. Since FERC and a 
number o f consultants to the FERC has already completed the task o f identifying the 
ancillary services, the actual methodology to identif)' these services will be discussed 
very briefly. However, in order to evaluate the ancillary services properly, it is still 
important to take a look into the background o f the proposal by FERC. The scope of the 
thesis is research the importance and costs o f three o f the ancillary services defined by 
FERC. For this thesis, the three ancillary services chosen include power system security, 
automatic generation control, and reactive power support. The cost o f these three 
services is most complex to compute due to a large number o f variables involved.
This thesis uses a production cost modeling techniques to evaluate each one of the 
above mentioned ancillary services. The methodology used for evaluation of these 
ancillary services will be discussed in detail in later chapters. A numerical example of 
evaluating the costs o f ancillary services for an arbitraiy power company is also included 
in this thesis.
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CHAPTER 2: 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF NOPR
In order to understand the FERC’s position in developing the Notice o f Proposed 
Rulemaking, it is important to look into the background of the current electric utility 
industry and the bulk power markets. This chapter will be concentrating on the historical 
developments in the electric utility industry that led the FERC to develop the NOPR.
2 .1 , S tru ctu re  o f  th e  E lectric  Industry a t  E nactm en t o f  
F ederal Power Act:
The Federal Power Act was enacted in an age o f mostly self-sufficient, vertically 
integrated electric utilities, in which generation, transmission, and distribution facilities 
were owned by a single entity and sold as part of a bundled service (delivered electric 
energy) to wholesale and retail customers. Most electric utilities built their own power 
plants and transmission systems, entered into interconnection and coordination 
arrangements with neighboring utilities, and entered into long-term contracts to make 
wholesale requirements sales (bundled sales o f generation and transmission) to 
municipal, cooperative, and other investor-owned utilities (lOUs) connected to each 
utility's transmission system. Each system covered limited service areas. This structure of 
separate systems arose naturally due primarily to the cost and technological limitations on 
the distance over which electricity could be transmitted.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Through much o f the 1960s, utilities were able to avoid price increases, but still 
achieve increased profits, because o f substantial increases in scale economies, 
technological improvements, and only moderate increases in input prices. Thus, there 
was no pressure on regulatory commissions to use regulation to affect the structure o f the 
industry [3].
2 .2 . S ign ifican t Changes in th e  Electric In dustry :
In the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s, a number o f significant events 
occurred in the electric industry that changed the perceptions o f utilities and began a shift 
to a more competitive marketplace for wholesale power. This was the beginning of period 
when consumers became concerned about higher electricity rates and questioned any 
price increases filed by utilities.
During this same time frame, the construction of nuclear and other capital- 
intensive “baseload" facilities contributed to the continuing cost increases and 
uncertainties in the industry. These investments were made based on the assumptions that 
there would be steady increases in the demand for electricity and continued large 
increases in the price of oil. However, due to conservation and economic downturns, the 
expected demand increases did not materialize. Load growth virtually disappeared in 
some areas, and many utilities unexpectedly found themselves with excess capacity. In 
addition, by the 1980s. the oil cartel collapsed, with a resulting glut o f  low-priced oil. At 
the same time, inflation substantially increased the costs of these large "baseload" 
generating plants. Surging interest rates further increased the cost of the capital needed to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
finance and capitalize these projects and completion schedules were significantly 
extended by, in part, more stringent safety and environmental requirements.
As a result, expensive large baseload plants came onto the market or were in the 
process o f  being constructed, for which there was little or no demand. Accordingly, 
between 1970 and 1985, average residential electricity prices more than tripled in 
nominal terms, and increased by 25% after adjusting for general inflation. Moreover, 
average electricity prices for industrial customers more than quadrupled in nominal terms 
over the same period and increased 86% after adjusting for inflation. The rapidly 
increasing rates for electric power during this period, together with the opportunities 
provided by the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA), also prompted 
some industrial customers to bypass utilities by constructing their own generation 
facilities. This further exacerbated rate increases for remaining customers —primarily 
residential and commercial customers.
Consumers responded to these "rate shocks" by exerting pressure on regulatory 
bodies to investigate the prudence of management decisions to build generating plants, 
especially when construction resulted in cost overruns, excess capacity, or both. Between 
1985 and 1992, write-offs of nuclear power plants totaled $22.4 billion. These write-offs 
significantly reduced the earnings of the affected utilities. Delays in obtaining rate 
increases to reflect the effects of inflation further reduced investor returns. Thus, many 
utilities became reluctant to commit capital to long-term construction decisions involving 
large scale generating plants.
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In addition to economic changes in the industry, significant technological changes 
in both generation and transmission have occurred since 1935. Through the 1960s. bigger 
was cheaper in the generation sector and the industry was able to capitalize on economies 
o f scale to produce power at lower per-unit costs from larger and larger plants. As a 
result, large utility companies that could finance and manage construction projects o f 
larger scale had a price advantage over smaller utility companies and customers who 
might otherwise have considered building their own generating units. Scale economies 
encouraged power generation by large vertically-integrated utility companies that also 
transmitted and distributed power. Beginning in the 1970s, however, additional 
economies o f scale in generation were no longer being achieved. A significant factor was 
that larger generation units were found to need relatively greater maintenance and 
experience longer downtimes. The electric industry faced the situation "where the price of 
each incremental unit of electric power exceeded the average cost." Bigger was no longer 
better [3].
Further dictating against larger generation units were advances in technologies 
that allowed scale economies to be exploited by smaller size units, thereby allowing 
smaller new plants to be brought on line at costs below those o f the large plants o f the 
1970s and earlier. Such new technologies include combined cycle units and conventional 
steam units that use circulating fluidized bed boilers.
The combined cycle generating plants generally use natural gas as their primaiy 
fuel. This technology has been made possible by the development o f  more efficient gas 
turbines, shorter construction lead times, lower capital costs, increased reliability, and
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relatively minimal environmental impacts. Similarly, the circulating fluidized bed 
combustion boilers, fueled by coal and other conventional fuels, provide a more efficient 
and less polluting resource.
Today, the optimum size o f generation plants has shifted from more than 500 MW 
(10-year lead time) to smaller units (one-year lead time) in the 50- to 150-MW range. 
Indeed, smaller and more efficient gas-fired combined-cycle generation facilities can 
produce power on the grid at a cost between 3 and 5 cents per kWh. This is significantly 
less than the costs for large plants constructed and installed by utilities over the last 
decade, which were typically in the range o f 4 to 7 cents per kWh for coal plants and 9 to 
15 cents for nuclear plants.
2.3 . The Public U tility R eg u la to ry  Policies A ct (PURPA) 
a n d  th e Growth o f C om petition:
In enacting PURPA, Congress recognized that the rising costs and decreasing 
efficiencies o f utility-owned generating facilities were increasing rates and harming the 
economy as a whole. To lessen dependence on expensive foreign oil, avoid repetition o f 
the 1977 natural gas shortage, and control consumer costs. Congress sought to encourage 
electric utilities to conserve oil and natural gas. In particular. Congress sanctioned the 
development o f alternative generation sources designated as "qualifying facilities" (QFs) 
as a means o f reducing the demand for traditional fossil fuels, PURP.A. required utilities to 
purchase power from QFs at a price not to exceed the utility's avoided costs and to sell 
backup power to QFs.
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PURPA specifically set forth limitations on who. and what, could qualify as QFs. 
In addition to technological and size criteria, PURPA set limits on who could own QFs. 
The rapid expansion and performance o f the QF industry demonstrated that traditional, 
vertically integrated public utilities need not be the only sources of reliable power. During 
this period, the profile o f generation investment began to change, and a market for non- 
traditional power supply beyond the purchases required by PURPA began to emerge. QFs 
were limited to cogenerators and small power producers. However, other non-traditional 
power producers who could not meet the QF criteria began to build new capacity to 
compete in bulk power markets, without such PURPA benefits as the mandatory purchase 
requirements. These producers, known as independent power producers (IPPs), were 
redominantly single-asset generation companies that did not own any transmission or 
distribution facilities. While traditional utilities were generally reluctant at that time to 
invest in new generating facilities under cost o f  service regulation, utilities increasingly 
became interested in participating in this new generation sector. They organized affiliated 
power producers (APPs), with assets not included in utility rate base, and sought to sell 
power in their own service territories and the territories o f other utilities. At the same 
time, power marketers arose. These entities — owning no transmission or generation — 
buy and sell power.
There were two major impediments to the development of IPPs and APPs. First, 
the ownership restrictions o f the Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA) severely 
inhibited these new entities from entering the generation business. Second, these entities 
needed transmission service in order to compete in electricity markets.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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While the FERC had no authority to remove PUHCA restrictions, it encouraged 
the development o f IPPs and APPs, as well as emerging power marketers, by authorizing 
market-based rates for their power sales on a case-by-case basis and by encouraging more 
widely available transmission access.
Market-based rates helped to develop competitive bulk power markets. A 
generating utility allowed to sell its power at market-based rates could move more 
quickly to take advantage o f short-term or even long-term market opportunities than those 
laboring under traditional cost-of-service tariffs, which entail procedural delays in 
achieving tariff approvals and changes.
The economic and technological changes in the transmission and generation 
sectors helped give impetus to the many new entrants in the generating markets who 
could sell electric energy profitably with smaller scale technology at a lower price than 
many utilities selling from their existing generation facilities at rates reflecting cost. 
However, the advantages o f these technological advances can be achieved only if  more 
efficient generating plants can obtain access to the regional transmission grids. Because 
the traditional vertically integrated utilities still favor their own generation if and when 
they provide transmission access to third parties, barriers continue to exist to cheaper, 
more efficient generation sources.
2.4. The E nergy Policy A ct :
In response to the competitive developments following PURPA. and the fact that 
PUHCA and lack o f  transmission access remained major barriers to new generators.
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Congress enacted Title VII o f  the Energy Policy Act o f  1992 (Energy Policy Act). A goal 
o f the Energy Policy Act was to promote greater competition in bulk power markets by 
encouraging new generation entrants.
2.5. The P resen t Com petitive Environment:
Following the Energy Policy Act, the FERC established rules: (I) for certain 
generators to obtain EWG status and thus an exemption from PUHCA; and (2) that 
required transmission information availability. The FERC also pursued a number o f 
initiatives aimed at fostering the development o f more competitive bulk power markets, a 
new look at undue discrimination under the FPA, easing of market entry for sellers of 
generation from new facilities, and initiation o f a number o f industry-wide reforms.
In the Stranded Cost NOPR the FERC recognized that the trend toward greater 
transmission access and the transition to a fully competitive bulk power market could 
cause some utilities to incur stranded costs as wholesale requirements customers (or retail 
customers) use their supplier's transmission to purchase power elsewhere [3]. As the 
FERC noted, a utility may have built facilities or entered into long-term fuel or purchased 
power supply contracts with the reasonable expectation that its customers would renew 
their contracts and would pay their share o f long-term investments and other incurred 
costs. If the customer obtains another power supplier, the utility may have stranded costs. 
If the utility cannot locate an alternative buyer or somehow mitigate the stranded costs, 
the FERC explained that "the costs must be recovered from either the departing customer 
or the remaining customers or borne by the utility's shareholders." .Accordingly, the
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FERC proposed to establish provisions concerning the recovery o f wholesale and retail 
stranded costs by public utilities and transmitting utilities [2].
2.6. Need fo r  R e f  orm:
The many changes discussed above have converged to create a situation in which 
new generating capacity can be built and operated at prices substantially lower than many 
utilities' embedded costs o f generation. Non-traditional generators are taking advantage of 
the opportunity presented by the developments in technology and reduction in fuel costs. 
Indeed, the non-traditional generators' share of total U.S. electricity generation increased 
from 4 percent in 1985 to 10 percent in 1993.
Much of this increased share o f generation is the result o f competitive bidding for 
new generation resources that has occurred in 37 states. Since 1984, almost 4,000 
projects, representing over 400,000 MW, have been offered in response to requests. Over 
350 projects have been selected to supply 20,000 MW, and, o f these, 126 are now online 
producing almost 7,800 MW of power. In addition, the cost o f  utility-generated 
electricity differs widely across the major regions o f the United States. Average utility 
rates range from 3 to 5 cents in the Northwest to 9 to II cents in California [3]. 
Electricity consumers are demanding access to lower cost supplies available in other 
regions of the United States, and access to the newer, lower cost generation resources. It 
is also important that the non-traditional generators o f cheaper power be able to gain 
access to the transmission grid on a non-discriminatory open access basis.
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The FERC's goal is to ensure that customers have the benefits o f  competitively 
priced generation. However, FERC must do so without abandoning the traditional 
obligation to ensure that utilities have a fair opportunity to recover prudently incurred 
costs and that they maintain power supply reliability [2]. As well, the benefits of 
competition should not come at the expense o f other customers. The FERC believes that 
requiring utilities to provide non-discriminatory open access transmission tariffs, while 
simultaneously resolving the extremely difficult issue of recovery o f  transition costs is 
the key to reconciling these competing demands.
2.7. M arket Power:
Unlike new generating capacity, transmission remains and is expected to remain a 
natural monopoly. The FERC has addressed the natural monopoly character of 
transmission in the major cases summarized above and in the FERC's recent 
Transmission Pricing Policy Statement [2]. The monopoly characteristic exists in part 
because entry into the transmission market is restricted or difficult. In addition, as unit 
costs are less for larger lines and networks, transmission facilities still exhibit scale 
economies. From an economic, environmental, and aesthetic viewpoint, it is often better 
for a single owner (or group of owners) to build a single large transmission line rather 
than for many transmission owners to build smaller parallel lines on a non-coordinated 
basis.
Further, effective competition among owners of parallel transmission lines is 
unlikely, and often impossible, with existing practices and technology. For example, on
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an alternating current (AC) electric system, electricity flows on parallel paths based on 
the impedance o f each path. With two electric systems providing parallel contract paths, a 
share o f  the actual power flows would occur on each system according to the physical 
characteristics o f the system.
2.8. D iscrim inatory Access
Some transmission-owning utilities have voluntarily begun to offer unbundled 
transmission tariff services to third-party suppliers and purchasers o f wholesale power, 
though none have done so to the extent proposed by this rule. However, because utilities 
are naturally profit maximizers and monopoly suppliers to their native load, the vast 
majority o f  transmission-owning utilities have not agreed to give up their market power 
voluntarily.
Transmission-owning utilities have an incentive to deny access either by not filing 
any open access tariff or by filing a tariff that offers services inferior to those used by the 
transmission owner. This is particularly true for those utilities that emerged from the 
recent decades o f technological and legal changes as high-cost generation companies. 
Open access transmission places their existing generation at risk because their wholesale 
customers may seek alternative lower price suppliers. It is in their self-interest to maintain 
and use market power to retain (or expand) market share for their existing generation 
facilities, at least until they can get their generation costs in line with current market 
prices. Because generating units are usually depreciated over a 30- to 50-year physical
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life, many high cost companies may attempt to exercise transmission market power for 
decades to preserv e the value of past generation investments.
In the past, transmission-owning utilities have discriminated against others 
seeking transmission access. Transmission-owning utilities have denied access by 
outright refusals to deal. While such actions tend to be rare, likely because transmission 
owners fear they may trigger antitrust action, they have occurred. More often, however, 
discrimination is likely to be manifested more subtly and indirectly. One such way would 
be for transmission owners to adopt a negotiating strategy that involves a sequence of 
informational and other requirements over a protracted period of time. By the time all o f 
the requirements are finally satisfied, the window for the customer's trade opportunity has 
closed. Another way of frustrating access is to substantially change the terms of 
negotiated agreements through protracted delay, including filings with regulatory 
agencies.
Another way for transmission-owning utilities to frustrate access and competition 
is to allow access, but only on non-comparable or unsupportable terms. The conditions 
put forth to these transmission buyers were inferior to the conditions under which the 
transmission owners themselves use or could use the transmission grid or on terms and 
conditions that have no operational or financial basis.
This type o f discrimination was also applicable to the ancillary services. A 
transmitting utility may offer to a transmission customer ancillary services (e.g.. 
scheduling) that are inferior to the services it provides for itself. Transmission owners 
may be free to choose whether to supply some o f these services to themselves or contract
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
16
for them if available more cheaply elsewhere. Third-party transmission customers do not 
always have this option on a comparable basis.
2.9. A nalogies to th e  N a tu ra l Gas In dustry
The electric industry today is analogous in many ways to the natural gas industry 
before the FERC issued Order Nos. 436 and 636. Then, natural gas pipelines were 
primarily merchants offering a bundled sales service, which provided gas to customers at 
the city-gate from the pipelines' own system supplies. In addition, pipelines moved a 
relatively small amount of third-party gas under a separate transportation service. To 
meet their sales service obligations, pipelines purchased most o f their system supply from 
third-party producers under long-term contracts.
In the early 1980s, due to changing market conditions, the prices under many of 
these contracts ended up being higher than those available in the then evolving spot 
market. Because o f  the long-term contracts and the resulting higher cost gas, system 
supply gas tended to be more costly than gas that the customers could buy in the 
competitive spot market. At the same time, the transportation service bundled with a 
pipeline's sales service was usually superior to the transportation service third parties 
could obtain. Essentially, the pipeline would provide itself service that had much greater 
flexibility and often promised greater reliability than that available to third-party 
shippers. Pipelines had a considerable incentive to maintain this difference in 
transportation service quality to make their own, more expensive gas more attractive.
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A similar situation exists today in the electric industry. Traditional public utilities 
deliver bundled service —generation and transmission — to most o f their wholesale 
customers. They have monopoly control over transmission facilities and thus control 
access to their customers. The lack o f non-discriminatory access to transmission services 
raises the same general concerns that were prevalent in the gas industry. Accordingly, 
unless similar regulatory measures are undertaken, the FERC expects the same type o f 
discriminatory and anticompetitive behavior will continue in the electric industry as was 
present in the gas industry, because denying non-discriminatory access will continue to 
be in the economic self-interest o f transmission monopolists, absent regulatory changes.
The experience in the gas area influences the decision that, at a minimum, 
functional unbundling o f  wholesale services is necessary' in order to obtain non- 
discriminatory open access and to avoid anti-competitive behavior in wholesale 
electricity markets.
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CHAPTER 3: 
ANCILLARY SERVICES
Ancillary services are the services which were traditionally provided by the power 
utility companies as a part o f  regular power supply. In the attempt to decrease the cost of 
power, the utility companies have been forced to identify each o f  the components of 
power and evaluate the cost o f  each one of those components. This is being done so that 
these ancillary services are provided only to the entities who demand for them and pay 
for them. In this way, the cost o f  providing these ancillary services will not be subsidized 
by the non-users, thus eliminating the free ride effect. This chapter will concentrate on 
the Ancillary Services, as defined by the FERC and other entities, and the interconnected 
operations services in some detail. In addition, the scope o f interconnected operation 
services (lOS) will also be discussed in this chapter.
3.1. Defining A n c illa ry  Services:
FERC identified the following six Ancillary Services as necessary to ensure open 
access [4].
1. Scheduling, System Control and Dispatch
2. Reactive Supply and Voltage Control from Generation Sources
3. Regulation and Frequency Response
4. Energy Imbalance
18
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5. Operating Reserve - Spinning Reserve
6. Operating Reserve - Supplemental Reserves
This thesis will restrict the research to reactive power supply (# 2), regulation (# 
3) and providing operating reserves (# 5). The other ancillary services are equally 
important, but calculation o f costs o f those ancillary services is rather simple. The 
ancillary services evaluated in this thesis were selected based on number o f variables 
effecting the costs.
3.2. In terconnected  Operations Services:
Ancillary Services are a subset of Interconnected Operations Services (lOS) that 
FERC requires a Transmission Provider to either provide, offer to provide, or arrange for 
the provision by others, to Transmission Customers. The lOS Working Group adopted 
the term IQS for the following services in addition to the ancillary services defined by 
FERC [3]:
(Voltage) Regulation 
Backup Supply 
Dynamic Scheduling 
Load Following
Real Power Transmission Losses 
Power Factor Correction 
Network Stability Services from Generation 
Black Start
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The above services are necessary to either ensure system reliability, to ensure 
open access, or to enable markets while simultaneously maintaining an equitable 
allocation of costs.
3.3 . New Packaging  - Old Services:
The North American electrical system is sometimes depicted as the largest and 
most complex “machine” in existence. The power system operates reliably and 
efficiently due largely to the combined efforts o f the entities (Control Areas, generators, 
etc.) that collectively operate the system.
The services described here (both Ancillary and other lOS) been around for many 
years. The services were provided and/or coordinated by the generation and transmission 
owners (many o f whom operated as Control Areas). The services were included or 
bundled within the integrated generation and transmission service provided by Control 
Areas to customers.
What is new about the services is the way they are packaged. Instead of being 
bundled with generation and/or transmission, the individual services are identified. 
Eventually, many o f these services are expected to be separately offered and separately 
priced by the service providers. In other words the services will be unbundled. The 
services themselves are not new, only the packaging [3] [6].
3.4 . Need fo r  the Evaluation:
The restructuring of the power industry is partially driven by federal legislation 
and the regulatory actions o f FERC and the state utility commissions, partially by
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economic factors, and partially by the independent actions of the players in the electric 
market. To ensure the maintenance of system reliability, the operational and technical 
aspects of the lOS required to maintain reliability while facilitating open access and 
enabling power markets, became the focus of all research into the NOPR. Operational 
and related issues that were addressed included [3]:
• What are the obligations o f the suppliers of the services?
• What are the obligations o f the purchasers o f the services?
• What are the roles of the Control Areas and other key players?
• What are the technical requirements of the services?
• Who will administer the purchase and provision o f the services?
• Who will be the providers o f last resort o f the services?
• Can the services be self-provided by Transmission Customers?
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CHAPTER 4: 
THE NORTH AMERICAN SYSTEM
The North American power system has evolved over the past 100 years. Initially, 
independent companies built and operated isolated (no electrical interconnections 
between companies) power systems. These isolated power systems were dependent on 
their own resources to handle both normal and emergency events. Beginning in the 
1930‘s utilities began to interconnect with one another. The driving forces behind the 
electrical interconnections were the ability to share resources, to schedule interchange, 
and in general increase reliability while lowering operating costs [3].
Q u e b e c
I n t e r c o n n e c t i o n
W e s  t e r n  
I n t e r c o n n e c t i o n
E a s t e r n  
in t e  rc  o n  n e  c t i o  nE R C O T  
I n t e r c o n  n e c t i o n
F ig u r e  1 T h e  in t e r c o n n e c t io n s  o f  N o r t h  A.m e r i c .a. [3]
This chapter also discusses the various interconnections in the North American 
svstem. This division of the system can be observed in the figure 1. There are certain
22
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aspects o f the system that only pertain to one o f  the interconnections. In this thesis, the 
research is limited to criteria set forth by Western System Coordinating Council.
From these early inter-connections evolved today’s complex power system 
designs. North America is currently divided into four major Interconnections as 
illustrated in Figure 1. (Alaska and Hawaii contain separate, smaller Inter-connections.) 
The different Interconnections do not connect with one another via ac transmission lines. 
Thus, interchange transactions between the respective Inter-connections are limited to the 
capacit)' o f available dc (direct current) tie-lines.
4.1. The Control Area Concept:
For each of the Interconnections to operate safely, reliably, and provide 
dependable electric service to its customers, it must be continuously monitored and con­
trolled. This monitoring and control function is distributed among the Control Areas that 
comprise the Interconnections. There are approximately 150 Control Areas in the four 
major North American Interconnections.
C o n t r o l  A r e a  D e f in it io n ;
A. Control Area is an electrical system bounded by tie-line metering and 
telemetry. A Control Area controls generation directly to maintain interchange schedules 
with other Control Areas and contributes to frequency regulation of the Interconnection in 
which it is physically located [8]. A Control Area is an electric system that meets the 
following two requirements:
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• Directly controls its generation to continuously balance its actual interchange 
and scheduled interchange, and...
•  Assists the entire Interconnection with regulating and stabilizing the Inter­
connection's frequency.
C o n t r o l  A r e a  R e c o g n it io n :
To be recognized as a Control Area, a power system must be reviewed and 
confirmed by national and regional reliability organization representatives (see the NERC 
description that follows) that the system meets the following basic requirements [9]:
• Has metered interconnections (tie-lines) with other Control Areas and the 
necessary contracts to use those connections.
• Has the ability to effectively control generation and match its net actual inter­
change to its net scheduled interchange pursuant to NERC Control 
Performance Standards.
• Has generators equipped with governors under its control that are able to 
respond properly to Interconnection frequency changes.
• Has a control center with 24-hour-per-day staffing.
4.2. NERC an d  the Regional Councils:
The operation and control o f electrical power systems in North .A.merica has 
evolved into its present structure over the past century as power systems have grown in 
size and complexity. The present operational structure of power systems is largely 
defined and controlled by participation o f all involved parties in an organization called
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NERC (North American Electric Reliability Council). NERC in turn is composed of ten 
regional reliability councils.
NERC was formed shortly after the 1965 Northeast Blackout. This event clearly 
demonstrated the interdependence in the operations o f all parties participating in an 
interconnected power system. The need for all these parties to use consistent planning 
and operating procedures was clear, and NERC was the vehicle chosen to implement that 
consistency [11].
NERC's primary objective is to promote the reliabilit) of the electricity supply by 
creating and monitoring compliance with NERC policies, principles, criteria, standards 
and guides for reliability. The collection o f NERC operating documents, termed the 
“rules o f the road”, sets forth requirements and guidelines for operating and planning 
electric generating capacity and interconnected power systems.
4 .3 . lOS Selection  Criteria:
General and specific selection criteria for determining if an enabling market 
function is an lOS were developed and used to create a list of required lOS. Note that 
this list o f required lOS is just an initial attempt at defining lOS. As time passes and 
operating experience in the emerging market structure accumulates, it is likely that 
additions, deletions and modifications will change the list contents.
G e n e r a l  C r it e r ia  f o r  Id e n t if y in g  IO S :
lOS were not arbitrarily selected from available enabling functions, but derived 
from specific needs for power system reliability, for power system operability, to ensure
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cost equity, and to support open access. Three general selection criteria for determining 
if an enabling function is a required IOS are described below [3].
C riteria  1: R eliability
If an enabling function is required to ensure the reliable operation of the 
interconnected power system, it satisfies general Criteria 1. For example, following a 
generation loss Operating Reserves (Spinning and Supplemental) are often necessary to 
ensure an ability to balance load and generation and recover the system frequency.
C riteria 2: Open A ccess an d  Enable Markets
If  an enabling function is required to ensure that Transmission Customers are 
provided open and equal access and that market structures are enabled, it satisfies general 
Criteria 2. IOS are made available to Transmission Customers to enable all customers to 
compete on an equal footing with established market players. For example, if  a Dynamic 
Scheduling IOS were not available, a Load Serving Entity's choices in obtaining certain 
services could be restricted to its Host Control Area.
C riteria  3: Equity
An enabling function must, in general, satisfy either Criteria 1 or 2 to be 
designated a required IOS. In contrast, general selection Criteria 3 is an all encompassing 
criteria that applies to the selection o f all IOS. All o f the entities that make use of the 
transmission system must equitably share the costs associated with the use o f that system. 
If users are allowed access to the transmission system without a proportional share of the 
costs, unfair market conditions exist. For example, a Real Power Transmission Losses
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IOS is necessary as it is designed to ensure that all those who create real power losses 
reimburse the power system for those losses.
Figure 2 graphically illustrates the application o f  the three general selection 
criteria. Note that the equity criteria applies to all services while Criteria 1 and 2 apply 
to selected services. If  these criteria are applied to FERC’s Ancillary Services it is 
apparent that all three criteria apply to each o f  the six Ancillary Services. (All six o f 
FERC’s Ancillary Services would be situated at the intersection o f the two circles in 
Figure 2.)
RELIABILITY i < -i
S  “  J  EN A BLI
F i g u r e  2  G e n e r a l  S e l e c t io n  C r i t e r i a  f o r  D e t e r m in in g  if  a n  E n a b l i n g
F u n c t i o n  i s  a n  IOS (31
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4 .4 . Role o f  th e  Control Areas:
New players will emerge as the electricity market evolves and matures. 
Transmission Providers, Transmission Customers, Generation Providers, Power 
Marketers, Load Serving Entities, etc. are some o f the possible market players. (The 
players and their functions are described in a later section.)
Control Areas are a necessary entity. The Control Area is the glue that holds the 
interconnected power system together. Control Areas continually monitor the health of 
their portion of the power system and ensure all players are provided equal access to the 
transmission system. Control Areas currently typically perform the functions of 
generation/load balance, transmission system security, and emergency preparedness. It is 
assumed that regardless of the new market structure the Control Areas will continue to 
perform the generation/load balance function.
IOS often provide a shared benefit. For example, consider Operating Reserves. It 
is generally more cost effective to share reserve requirements than to self-supply. The 
Control Area operator serves the critical function o f enabling this sharing to occur.
Some IOS by their nature must be provided through a Control Area. The Control 
Area will often serve as the intermediary between IOS suppliers and IOS customers to 
schedule, coordinate, measure. verif>'. etc. Figure 3 illustrates the key role of the Control 
Areas. For IOS that may not necessarily be required to come directly from the Control 
Area, the Control Area will typically serve a role o f coordinating, scheduling, 
verification, accounting, payback, etc.
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COORDINATION
IOS
CUSTOMERS
IOS 
UPPLIER
NTROLAR
DINATING
F i g u r e  3  R e l a t io n s h ip s  B e t w e e n  K e y  P l a y e r s  [3 |
C r i t i c a l  D u t i e s  o f  a  C o n t r o l  A r e a :
There are several critical duties, which in the opinion o f the IDS WG must be 
performed by Control Areas.
Prim ary D uties:
All o f the Control Areas in an Interconnection have two primary duties; to 
maintain a close match between their actual and scheduled interchange and contribute to 
the frequency regulation o f  the Interconnection. These primary duties are fundamental to 
sound system operation and must be continued. A Control Area controls its actual inter­
change and contributes to frequency regulation by adjusting its controlled generation 
through an automatic generation control system, or AGC. NERC and the Regional 
Councils have developed methods and procedures for monitoring the effectiveness o f 
AGC systems. This monitoring role must continue.
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Reserve Monitoring:
Control Areas have always been responsible for maintaining adequate reserve 
levels. As more players enter the electrical marketplace the task o f monitoring reserve 
levels will likely increase in complexity. Control Areas are ideally suited as the reserve 
monitoring entity.
Scheduling:
Control Areas are the agent for monitoring, administering and coordinating all 
scheduling activities. A Purchasing-Selling Entity must work through their Control .Area 
when scheduling. A central scheduling role is critical to ensure system reliability, open 
and fair access and productive use o f transmission and generation resources.
IOS:
The Control Areas should be the designated monitor for compliance by IOS 
purchasers and the qualifier o f IOS suppliers. As a condition o f service within a Control 
Area’s system, all Transmission Customers must satisfy IOS purchase requirements and 
all IOS suppliers must satisfy the standards of IOS suppliers.
C o m pl ia n c e  W it h  O p e r a t in g  P o l ic ie s:
A Control Area is obligated to adhere to all NERC Operating Criteria. 
Requirements, and Standards. Regional Councils, Power Pools, or other associations also 
may impose their own operating criteria and procedures. It is recommended that all 
NERC and Regional Operating guidelines be updated to reflect the new operating
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environment in general and IOS in particular. IOS definitions should become part o f 
each Regions Operating Policies.
C o m pliance  w it h  C o n t r o l  P e r f o r m a n c e  S t a n d a r d s :
NERC and the Regional Councils have developed generation control performance 
standards to evaluate a Control Area's performance in maintaining a load to generation 
balance. Two sets o f standards are used, one for normal conditions (the A1 and A2 
standards) and one for disturbance conditions (the B1 and B2 standards). Methods have 
been developed to calculate a Control Area's conformance to these standards. Control 
Areas are then able to judge their own performance and compare their performance to the 
performance of other Control Areas. These standards may have to be modified and new 
standards developed to adjust for emerging markets. In addition, sets o f standards may be 
required for various IOS.
4.5 . Functions in  the E lectric Power M arket:
The functions performed in an electric power market can be described in temis o f 
seven functional areas. In the past, all of these functions may have been performed by 
one vertically integrated utility. In future markets different entities may perform the 
various functions. The functional areas include Generation, Transmission Wires. 
Distribution Wires. Wholesale Sales, Retail Sales. Market Administration, and System 
Operations.
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G e n e r a t io n :
Generation provides capacity and energy to the system. Generation providers 
include independent power producers (IPP), qualifying facilities (QF), and the generating 
assets o f vertically integrated utilities.
T r a n s m is s io n  W i r e s :
Transmission Wires provides for the transmission of power and energy from 
generation sources to the various transmission substations. Transmission Wires includes 
transmission companies and the transmission assets o f vertically integrated utilities.
D is t r ib u t io n  W i r e s :
Distribution Wires provides for the distribution o f power and energy from the 
local transmission substation to the end-use customers. Distribution Wires includes 
distribution companies and the distribution assets o f vertically integrated utilities and 
transmission dependent utilities (municipal utilities, Cooperatives, etc.).
W h o l e s a l e  S a l e s :
Wholesale Sales provides for the wholesale sale o f capacity and energy services. 
Wholesale Sales involves sales from a generator to an entity which then sells to either 
another entity or an end-use customer. Wholesale Sales includes Generators. Power 
Marketers, and the power marketing branches o f vertically integrated utilities.
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R e t a il  S a l e s :
Retail Sales provides for the retail sale o f capacity and energy to an end-use 
customer. Retail Sales includes distribution utilities, retail aggregators and Load Serving 
Entities (LSE).
M a r k e t  A d m in is t r a t io n :
Market Administration provides for the complete or panial operation of the 
central market structure. The Market Administration function is performed by Power 
Exchanges and Power Pools.
S y s t e m  O p e r a t io n s :
System Operations provides for the coordination, operation and control of the 
power system. System Operations includes Independent System Operators (ISO), 
Control Areas, tight power pools, sub-Control Areas and Scheduling Coordinators.
4.6. M arket E n titie s  fo r  IOS:
The functional areas described in Section 4.4 may be performed by several 
different entities that exist in the electrical market. The following is a list and description 
of entities. This list is not complete as new entities may emerge at any time especially 
given the uncertainty surrounding the future electric marketplace [3].
C o n t r o l  A r e a s :
Control Areas are entities which operate an automatic generation control (AGC) 
system and provide real-time monitoring and dispatch o f generation and transmission.
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Two types o f Control Areas are described below and illustrated in Figure 5, the Host 
Control Area and the metered or electronic Control Area.
H ost Control Areas:
The Host Control Area is the Control Area in which the transmission system that 
a Load Serving Entity (LSE) is connected to is physically located. In the absence o f 
dynamic scheduling (see Figure 4), the Host Control Area is the LSE’s generation 
Control Area. If the transmission system to which the LSE is connected is physically 
located within several Control Areas, those Control Areas are the Host Control Areas for 
portions o f the LSE’s load. The Host Control Area o f an LSE never changes except if  the 
LSE forms its own Control Area.
Control Area:
The LSE’s Control Area is the Control Area that performs the generation control 
function (AGC) for the LSE. This Control Area could also be referred to as the LSE’s 
metered Control Area or electronic Control Area. Using dynamic scheduling, an LSE 
may change its Control Area from its Host Control Area to a new Control . The new 
Control Area then becomes the LSE's generation Control Area.
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(A)
k«êA’S iRANft...
(B)
THIS LSE HAS THE 
SAME HOST CONTROL 
AREA AND METERED 
(ELECTRONIC) CONTROL 
AREA
THIS CONTROL ARE 
IS THE LSE’S METERED 
OR ELECTRONIC 
CONTROL AREA.
DYNAMIC.
SCHEDULE
F i g u r e  4  C o n t r o l  A r e a  C o n c e p t  [3]
P u r c h a s in g - S e l l in g  E n t it ie s  (F SE ):
Purchasing-Selling Entities (PSEs) are non-Control Area systems that fall into 
two categories:
(1) Those that operate generation or serve customers directly, and
(2) Those that perform marketing functions only and do not operate generation or serve 
customers directly.
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PSEs that neither operate generation nor serve customers directly, such as Power 
Marketers, are not within the metered boundaries o f a Control Area. This type o f entity is 
not associated with a Host Control Area per se, but must still rely on Control Areas for 
interchange schedule confirmation and implementation as well as the provision for 
certain IOS.
Purchasing-Selling Entities must be able to demonstrate to their respective 
Control Areas that all required IOS have been obtained. Types of PSE include 
Generation Providers, Load Serving Entities (LSE's) and Power Marketers.
Generation Provider:
An entity that provides capacity and energy to the power system. A Generation 
Provider does not necessarily generate the power and energy they deliver to their 
customers.
Load Serving E n tity  (LSE):
An entity which either aggregates load (wholesale) or directly serves load (retail).
Power M arketer:
An entity that performs a power marketing function (buying and selling) and does 
not operate generation or serve customers directly. A Power Marketer takes title to 
energy and capacity and markets the product to wholesale and retail customers.
T r a n s m is s io n  P r o v id e r s :
Transmission Providers are, in the strictest sense, just that - entities that are 
responsible for providing transmission service to Transmission Customers. In the
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practical sense, most Transmission Providers also operate generation, and many are 
Control Areas.
A Transmission Provider does not simply provide transmission service but is 
obligated to provide reliable (within contract limitations) transmission service. The 
reliability role o f the Transmission Provider extends to IOS. The Transmission Provider 
is the provider o f last resort for several IOS. As such, the Transmission Provider 
provides or arranges for the provision of the required IOS if an obligated entity does not 
do so in a timely fashion. The provider of last resort role is a critical power system 
reliability function.
Transmission Providers may be a vertically integrated utility, a transmission 
company, an ISO, a Power Pool or other entity which has the ability to provide 
transmission service.
T r a n s m is s io n  C u s t o m e r s :
A Transmission Customer is an entity which purchases transmission service from 
a Transmission Provider. Transmission Customers may be PSEs, Control Areas, or the 
Transmission Provider itself. The definition for a Transmission Customer is so broad that 
it helps to think of three distinct types of Transmission Customer:
• Those who simply connect to the transmission system
For example, a generator providing reserves
• Those who wheel across the transmission system
For example, a Power Marketer
• Those who directly serve load or are aggregators o f load.
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For example, an LSE 
IOS S u p p lie r :
It could be possible that an entity may be a supplier o f IOS and not fit into any of 
the other categories described in this section. The market structure o f IOS suppliers is not 
yet developed and the possible suppliers unknown at this time.
4.7. Existing M arket Structures:
The existing electricity market within every North American Interconnection is 
dominated by vertically integrated utilities. The utilities typically integrate all seven 
functional areas, absorbing the roles o f all entities within their corporate structure.
For example. Figure 5 illustrates how players and functions could interact in the 
dominant form o f the existing market structure. (For simplicity only one utility and one 
neighboring Control Area is shown in Figure 5.) The utility represented owns, operates, 
and control its own generation, transmission and distribution systems. The utility 
performs wholesale sales to other Control Areas and retail sales to its own customers.
The utility is also a Control Area and performs its own system operations 
function. Market Administration is accomplished in cooperation with other Control 
Areas and, if it exists, a Power Pool. The utility in Figure 5 has a corporate structure 
which integrates the roles o f all necessary entities. This utility functions as a Control 
Area. Transmission Provider, Transmission Customer, Load Serving Entity. Power 
Marketer and Generation Provider.
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The Control Area is responsible for scheduling transactions, generation dispatch, 
transmission system reliability, and various other system control tasks. All o f the 
services required to operate an interconnected power system are either provided for or 
arranged by the Control Areas. Wholesale sales are constantly being made between 
Control Areas to minimize operating costs and maximize profitability while maintaining 
system reliability.
GENERATION
VERTICALLY INTEGRATED 
UTILITY 
(ALSO THE CONTROL AREA)
WHOLESALE TRANSMISSION
SALES WIRES
RETAIL DISTRIBUTION
SALES WIRES
SYSTEM
OPERATIONS
NEIGHBORING 
CONTROL 
AREA
MARKET 
ADMINISTRATION
F ig u r e  5 D o m in a .n t  f o r m  o f  t h e  E x is t in g  M.a r k e t  S t r u c t u r e  [3]
R o l e  o f  P o w e r  P o o l s :
Utilities and Control Areas may band together to form a Power Pool. A Power 
Pool may be a “loose" or “tight” pool. A loose Power Pool is typically formed to ensure
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system reliability and/or to share resources (reserves). An example o f a loose Power Pool 
is the Mid-continent Area Power Pool (MAPP). The members o f  MAPP have entered 
into reserve sharing agreements and follow joint operating practices but the generation 
control function is handled by the individual Control Areas that are members of MAPP 
[3].
A tight Power Pool is the equivalent o f a large Control Area in which the 
generation control o f multiple utilities (many o f which are capable o f being their own 
Control Area) is turned over to the Power Pool’s control center. For example. 
Pennsylvania, Jersey, Maryland (PJM) is a tight Power Pool in which the generation 
control function is handled by PJM system operations. This method o f system operation 
is designed to reduce the operating costs for all the utilities o f  PJM as all generation is 
part o f a common pot and the least cost units receive preference.
4 .8. The Transition  Phase:
The current electrical marketplace is in a transition phase. New entities have 
emerged in recent years and as time progresses these entities will play an increasingly 
important role. Figure 6 illustrates some of the recent changes to the electrical market. 
The functions of newer entities such as IPPs (Generation), Power Marketers (Wholesale 
Sales), and LSEs (Retail Sales) are illustrated. The new entities arrange with their 
Control Area's to perform their function. For example, the Power Marketer and IPP 
schedule through their respective Control Areas.
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The Control Area is still a critical link that performs a key coordination role and 
generation/load balance role thereby helping ensure system reliability. The lOS WG 
envisions that the Control Areas’ role will continue in any emerging market structure.
4.9. lOS M arket S tructure:
It is envisioned that market structures for lOS will gradually develop that include 
lOS purchasers and lOS suppliers. The purchaser end o f the lOS market will include all 
those Transmission Customers who are required to obtain lOS. The supplier end of the 
lOS market will include all those entities who choose (and are qualified) to supply the 
actual lOS or supply the resources required to create an lOS.
RETAIL
SALES
(LSE)
GENERATION 
(IPP)
GENERATION
HOST CONTROL AREA
WHOLESALE 
SALES
TRANSMISSION 
WIRES
NEIGHBORING 
CONTROL 
AREARETAIL
SALES
DISTRIBUTION 
WIRES
SYSTEM 
OPERATIONS
MARKET 
ADMINISTRATION
WHOLESALE 
SALES 
(POWER 
MARKETERS)
F ig u r e  6 T h e T r a .n s it io n a l  M a r k e t  St r u c t u r e  [31
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Figure 7 illustrates a possible market structure for the Community Service 
classification of lOS.
NSMISSI
ROVIDE
ONTROÜ 
AREA
- 4 --------------------- ^
TRANSMISSION I 1 lOS
CUSTOMER SUPPLIER
SELF 
PROVISION 
OF AN lOS
F ig u r e  7  C o m m u n i t y  S e r v i c e  M a r k e t  S t r u c t u r e  [3 |
A typical transaction in this lOS market structure would entail a Transmission 
Customer purchasing an lOS firom their Transmission Provider. The Transmission 
Provider arranges for the provision o f  this lOS with the responsible Control Area. The 
Transmission Provider purchases the resources to create the lOS fi-om available, qualified 
lOS Suppliers. (For example, the Transmission Provider could purchase spinning 
reserves from a generation source.) The lOS Supplier supplies the lOS capabilities to the 
Control Area. The Control Area creates the lOS (for example, the Control Area could
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create Operating Reserve - Spinning from spinning reserves) and then deploys the service 
to the Transmission Customer.
The Control Area is the entity that actually deploys community IQS to the 
Transmission Customer. In many IQS transactions, the Transmission Provider can be 
viewed o f as the contractual provider o f the IQS while the Control Area is the physical 
provider of the IQS.
4 .10 . S e lf  Provision o flO S :
A  Transmission Customer may also choose to self-pro vide a community lOS. 
The Transmission Customer may use their own resources to self-pro vide or obtain the 
necessary resources directly from the lOS supplier. In either scenario for self-provision, 
the Control Area receives the lOS capabilities, creates the lOS, and deploys the service to 
the Transmission Customer.
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CHAPTER 5: 
APPROACH TO CALCULATING COSTS
This chapter discussed the approach that was used in this thesis to calculate the 
cost o f  the three ancillary services. In order to accurately calculate the value of a 
"megawatt " ,it is important to understand some basics o f  the power generation. This 
chapter also discusses some o f the most commonly used terms in the power generation 
industry.
5 .1 . Factors D eterm ining Generator O peration:
In the Power Industry, various types of generation units are used for different 
purposes. The operation o f a particular generator is defined based on factors including 
nature o f the unit, type of fuel it uses, it’s ramp rate, it's minimum up-time and down­
time, startup time, emissions, safety factors, and cycling costs.
N a t u r e  o f  t h e  U n it :
Due to significant difference in the behavior of nuclear, coal fired, gas fired and 
hydroelectric units, the units are used for different purposes. For instance, in nuclear 
powered units, it is not possible to change the amount of fuel rods (Highly radioactive) to 
control the output o f the unit. A very little control can be achieved by controlling the 
heat generated, therefore such units have very little difference between minimum and 
maximum generating capacities.
44
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Coal and gas fired units provide more control over the amount o f fuel input into 
the unit, thus controlling the output o f the unit. The coal can be controlled in the coal 
pile, or by slowing down the conveyor belt (Commonly used to transport coal from the 
coal pile to the burners). The gas flow in the gas fired units can be controlled by 
controlling the gas valves on the gas line.
Hydroelectric power units are easier to control, since the primary control rests 
with controlling the flow of water through the turbines. All these factors make the unit 
feasible for certain type of loads and not so feasible for other types o f load. In areas 
where there is a huge difference in the day (on-peak) and night (off-peak) loads, nuclear 
powered units are not attractive due to inability to swing the unit's output easily. Other 
factors as the initial investment versus return criteria is used to develop schemes to build 
new generation resources.
T y p e  o f  F u el  U s e d :
Type of fuel used can determine the availability and storage capacity of the fuel. 
For example, unused coal can be stored in the coal piles, as long as new shipment of coal 
does not arrive. However, it is not that easy to store the gas once it is already flowing in 
the pipelines. Some companies do hold gas storage facilities, but it costs a lot for other 
companies to store gas in rented gas storage. The unused nuclear fuel rods can easily be 
stored, but safety is a major concern while replacing the fuel rods.
For these reasons, the gas for the units is requested based on pre-analysis of the 
system, given the available resources and the load forecast. Once the gas is purchased by 
the power generation facility from the gas vendor, it is important to use the ordered gas.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
46
If for some reason the gas cannot be used (due to load forecasting errors or sudden 
changes in the area temperatures), arrangements have to made with the gas vendor, or 
some other storage company to save the gas for later use.
R a m p  R a t e :
Ramp rate is the speed of the unit response to control signals. Coal imits 
generally have ramp rate around 2 MW / Minute. Most Gas Units have ramp rates higher 
than Coal Units. During the periods o f  high load volatility, it is important to provide the 
system with enough load following capability. In some cases there might be four or five 
units needed at one time to provide enough load following capability for the system.
The ramp-rate provides information on how quickly a unit can respond to load 
changes, or emergencies. Higher ramp rates give the power system dispatchers more ease 
to operate the system in the most economical way. The ramp rates also play a vital role 
in calculation of on-line spinning reserve calculation. A unit with a ramp rate o f  2 MW / 
minute can only contribute 20 MW to the on-line spinning reserves, even if it is backed 
down more than that. This is due to the fact that the spinning reserves have to me made 
available to the system within 10 minute period. Therefore it is common practice to load 
the units with lower ramp-rates to the maximum and back the high ramp-rate units to 
provide on-line spinning reserves.
M in im u m  U p  T im e  a n d  D ow n  T im e :
Minimum up time is the time a unit has to stay on-line after it comes on-line. The 
up time is set based on safety, reliability and cost o f start-up fuels and labor. Minimum
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down time is the time the unit has to stay off-line when it comes off-line. This time is 
based on the cool-down time of the unit. Under some special conditions, these times can 
also be based on emissions from a particular unit. In case of nuclear units, minimum 
down time and up time is also controlled by supervisory boards.
These factors play an important role when committing the units for generation. A 
coal unit cannot be put on-line just for the peak of the day, due to it’s larger up-time. If 
the unit is committed for the peak load o f the day, the unit will have to stay an additional 
number of hours to meet it’s minimum up-time (Generally 8-12 hours for coal fired 
units). In such cases, gas powered generation provides more flexibility in operation.
S t a r t  T im e :
The Start Time is the time it takes a unit to get on-line and upto full load from a 
cold start. The start time o f less than 10 minutes makes the unit available for off-line 
quick-start reserves. Such units are designated as peakers or peaking units. Such units 
are dispatched differently than the regular thermal units.
High start-up times, as in case o f nuclear and coal units, makes it impossible to 
use these units in case o f trip of another unit or transmission. NERC allows the use o f 
quick-start units (On-line and upto full load within 10 minutes) to contribute towards off­
line operating reserves [8].
E m is s io n s :
Certain states require certain emission standards for the units located in specific 
locations. Such standards also limit the operation of some units at any one time using a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
48
specific fuel. Emissions can also be monitored by the plant. In these cases only a certain 
number o f units out o f all available units can be used on-line at one time to keep the plant 
emissions under the specified.
S a f e t y ;
Safety o f  the workers and the equipment can also lead to some restrictions on 
certain units. For instance while re-fueling a Nuclear Unit, extreme pre-cautions are 
taken to avoid any leak o f radio active material into the atmosphere. All thermal units 
have to be cooled down to a safe temperature, before any work can be performed close to 
the boiler.
C y c l in g  C o s t s :
Cycling costs o f the unit also play an important role in decision to take a unit off­
line or put a unit on-line. These are the mechanical wear and tear cost that are incurred 
when a unit is cycled. These costs will be discussed in detail in a later sections.
5.2. R estric tion s on H ydroelectric Units:
Hydroelectric power plants also have certain restrictions associated with their 
operation. Even though the amount of water passing through the turbines can be 
controlled by the operations personnel, but there is a set amount of water that has to be 
passed every period. These limits are set generally by Bureau of Land Management 
(ELM) and other state agencies.
In certain areas, the water from the hydroelectric power plants is used for 
agriculture down the stream. In that case, to protect the interest o f communities down the
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Stream, a certain minimum amount o f water has to be passed every day. There are also 
some ecological controlling facts for water. During a certain season, fish flush 
(Migrating o f  fish up the river) also controls the maximum water that can be passed every 
day. This controls the water up the river (or lake) giving fish enough water to complete 
the migration upwards. Other water controlling factors include snow pack, amount o f 
seasonal rain fall, avoidance o f floods down the river etc.
5.3. Unit C ategories:
Based on the above mentioned factors, the units can be categorized into different 
classifications including base loaded units, cycled units, peaking units, quick-start units, 
and hydroelectric units.
Ba s e  Lo a d e d  U n it s :
These are the units on which the load stays constant most of the time. These have 
very high costs o f automatic generation control due to high cycling costs. These units are 
also dispatched for long terms and are not taken off-line during the off-peak hours. 
Nuclear units are a prime example o f such units. Load does not vary much on the nuclear 
units and the units are generally not taken off-line for load reasons. Larger coal units are 
also considered base loaded units.
Gas units in combined cycle mode are also considered semi base loaded Units. In 
combined cycle units, one or two gas units operate in normal operation mode. .A. Heat 
Recovery Steam Generator (HRSG) recovers the heat from the boilers of the gas units 
and puts it through a steam turbine. The steam turbine uses just the high pressured steam
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from the already operating gas units, thus does not bear a fuel cost. In combined cycle 
mode, the units are priced as a combined cycle unit, not as separate units. The gas units 
have to be on-line for a specific period of time (approximately 4 hours or more) to 
generate enough steam to put the heat recovery steam generator on-line. Due to such lag 
time, these units are considered base loaded units under most circumstances.
Cy c l e d  U n it s :
These are the units which are brought on-line for load whenever needed. Some of 
these units come on-line weekly to serve the business and industrial loads during the 
weekdays. These are then taken off-line for the weekends when the industrial and 
business loads are minimal. These units are mainly gas fired units. Minimum on-line 
time for these units average around 8 hours. Down time is average 4 hours (Minimum). 
Such specifications make these units flexible to load changes and outages.
These units can also be brought on-line during severe weather conditions. On the 
other hand these units some time replace the base loaded units during minor outages and 
trips.
P e a k in g  U n it s :
These units are used for peak shaving purposes. These units come on-line during 
sudden increases in the load, when the ramp rates o f the on-line units is not enough to 
cover the changes in load. These units generally cover for early morning business load 
increases as well as evening (lighting) load increases. During extreme summer heat, 
these units are also used for peak air conditioning load.
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Due to the special purpose o f these units, the maximum and minimum capacities 
on these units are very close. Their start-time, up-time and down-time are also 
significantly lower than other units making these imits very flexible.
Q u ic k -s t a r t  U n it s ;
These units are the units which can be made available for full load and 
synchronized to the system, from cold start, in less than 10 minutes (Western System 
Coordinating Council power system operating guidelines). This unique feature makes 
these units part of the off-line quick-start reserve (Part o f overall operating reserve).
H y d r o e l e c t r ic  U n it s :
Hydroelectric units are unique in the way that these units provide means to 
transfer energy from one part of the period to the other part o f the period. The amount of 
water to be passed through the hydroelectric power plants is pre-determined. Generally 
the period consists o f a day. It is upto the power company to allocate the hydroelectric 
resources to the most beneficial part o f the day. During off-peak hours, the units are kept 
to minimum output to conserve maximum water. The water is then passed through at the 
maximum rate during the peak hours to replace the most expensive power.
These units also have very good load following (Automatic generation control) 
capabilities. These units can be moved hundreds of megawatts within minutes by simple 
opening up the water flow through valves.
Due to no fuel costs, these units are also relatively cheaper than any other type of
power.
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5.4 . Fixed Vs. Variable Costs:
In order to study the cost o f  providing ancillary services, it is important to 
understand the difference between fixed and variable costs. This difference becomes vital 
when trying to generate profits to recover stranded investments. Variable costs are 
important in determining the cost o f operation o f a particular unit or generation facility. 
The generation facilities with least amoimt of stranded investments and with least 
operating costs are bound to be successful in a market based competitive environment.
F ix e d  C o s t s ;
These are the costs o f ownership o f the generation station. These costs also 
include the costs o f the unit, buildings, initial investment, fixed labor, and shareholder 
equity. In a competitive environment the fixed costs are stranded costs. Recovery of the 
stranded assets is based on the competitiveness of the electricity market.
The price o f  the ancillary services and the primary product (Electric Energy) is 
based on the variable costs. The profits, if any from providing the services are later used 
to recover some o f the stranded investments. The variable costs per unit o f power can be 
minimized by the optimal and efficient use o f generation resources.
There are certain types of costs which can be considered partially fixed and 
partially variable. One such example is the cost o f labor. If the generation plant is 
manned during the non-operating periods i.e. the labor is paid to be at the plant during 
that period, it will be considered fixed (sunk) cost and will not be included in the 
calculation of operating cost of the unit. However, if the labor is hired for the operation
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of the plant, then it will be considered as a part o f the operating cost calculation o f the 
unit.
In the competitive market, when companies are trying to minimize their operating 
costs to make their generation more productive, special attention needs to be paid to the 
recovery o f the fixed costs (Stranded assets). These were the costs that the initial 
investors and the share holders paid for the particular generation plant.
Va r ia b l e  C o s t s :
These are the costs o f providing the products. These costs include the costs of 
fuel, and wear and tear on the unit due to operation. The more the unit is operated, the 
higher these variable costs are.
When calculating the variable cost o f operating a unit, careful attention needs to 
be paid to the actual costs. Any non-variable (fixed) costs, if  included, will make the unit 
more expensive for dispatch and commitment purposes. Thus the unit will lose some 
opportunities for operation. On the other hand, if  some variable costs are not included in 
the operating costs, operation of the unit might end up costing to the generation company.
5.5. System  Security:
Every electric utility company, small or large, is required by NERC to maintain a 
high level of security of the system. The security o f individual system, in turn, results in 
the security of the interconnected system. Still there might be cases where a single 
company can initiate or contribute to the collapse o f the entire interconnected system.
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The importance o f system security became evident by the Northeast Blackout o f 
1965 when on November 9, 1965, the electric utility industry experienced the biggest 
power failure in the history [11]. While major power outages did take place before and 
after this event, no single event ever came close to what was later called Great Northeast 
Blackout of 1965. As it turned out, some 30 m illion people lost power with minutes and 
the normal life came to a halt in the communities. Many millions o f peoples stayed 
without power for as long as 13 hours.
R e s p o n s ib il it y  o f  M a in t a in in g  S y s t e m  S e c u r it y :
Bulk power dispatchers are responsible for maintenance of security of the system. 
The primary responsibility o f the bulk power dispatcher is to make sure that the system is 
operating in stable manner. Stability o f power system is defined as equality o f 
mechanical input from the generation units to the electrical output produced by the 
system.
Generally the factors affecting system stability can be divided into two groups.
1. Faults - line to line, line to line to line. 3 phase etc.
2. Loss o f generation (Due to mechanical or electrical system failure).
A system is considered secure if  it is able to withstand contingencies. The 
contingencies could be loss of a generation unit or loss o f transmission failure. Reserves 
can be kept based on two different factors.
a. Reserves based on percentage of the system load.
b. Reserv es based on the single largest contingency.
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Both o f the above methods are very commonly used in the electric power 
industry. Aside from the primary responsibility o f maintaining system security, the Bulk 
Power Dispatchers are also responsible for economic dispatch o f the system. Economic 
dispatch is defined as the most economical way to operate the system under the given 
conditions. There are five most commonly used states o f system security [1],
Normal S tate:
In normal operating mode, the loads are met by the combination of generation and 
purchase power resources. Also all o f the equipment (Generators, Transmission Lines) 
operate within the normal operating ratings.
A lert S tate:
Alert state is the state of the system when a single loss of generator or 
transmission could result in the system emergency state.
Emergency S tate:
In an emergency state, the system is no longer secure. Load is served but some of 
the equipment is being over stressed i.e. operated outside the normal ratings o f the 
equipment.
In Extrem is S tate:
In this state the system is not secure and also.
• Load is not being served.
• System is splitting / synchronous operation may be lost.
• Frequency is off normal.
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R estora tive  S tate:
In this state, the system is being re-synchronized which would eventually result in 
the operation o f  system in normal mode.
C o s t in g  R e s e r v e s :
In the light o f recent deregulation o f  the electric industry and consequential 
increase in the competition, electric utilities have realized that it might be much more 
economical to operate in a marmer to optimize the whole system instead of optimizing 
individual control areas. For example, a company in Southern California might not be 
able to generate cheaper in summer (Peak loading time for Southern California), and it 
might be beneficial to purchase reserves and pow er from the utilities in the northwest 
(Winter peaking utilities). Then by the same token, the utilities in northwest can 
purchase from southern California utilities during winter, when the load on southern 
California system is relatively mild. For any o f  such transaction to be beneficial to the 
supplier and to the buyer, proper analysis o f  the power system must be done to evaluate 
the cost o f  reserves.
5.6. A u tom atic  generation  con tro l:
Automatic Generation Control (AGC) is the capability o f the unit to automatically 
respond to the changes in the load. Generally one or more units in a system are set in this 
mode so that the under-generation (low frequency) or over-generation (high frequency) 
conditions do not take place. The base loaded units are usually not put in this mode due 
to high cycling costs o f those units.
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A properly tuned AGC system is needed for stable, reliable system operation, 
match system generation to obligations (load and sales), control flow on the tie lines, 
maintain stable system frequency, maintain NERC criteria (A1 and A2 Criteria - 
discussed later), optimize system economy, implement economic dispatch, and to 
implement ofF-system sales contracts [I].
T y p e s  o f  C o n t r o l :
Automatic Generation Control generally consists o f  two types o f control.
Economic D ispatch  Calculation:
Economic Dispatch Calculation is done every five minutes on most of the 
systems. This process calculates each of the synchronized units’ incremental cost. It then 
dispatches the units based on equal incremental costs. The results from this calculation 
are also transferred to load frequency control [1].
Load Frequency Control:
This used to be historically performed on analog computers. Implementation on 
newer digital computers is now in progress. This sends signals to individual plants to 
raise or lower the load on the unit based on the system load [1].
A r e a  C o n t r o l  E r r o r  (ACE):
ACE or Area Control Error can be given by the following equation,
A C E  =  I , - I ,  +  F b , ^ ' ( F . - F j ........................ ( a )
where.
I, = Actual Interchange Flow
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I, = Scheduled Interchange Flow
Fbias = Frequency Support Bias = 291 MW / 0.1 Hz.
Fj = Actual System Frequency
F; = Scheduled System Frequency
Interchange stands for the net interchange on the tie lines. The frequency bias 
support is the indiv idual company’s support to the interconnection frequency.
Scheduled frequency is typically 60 HZ. But it could be 59.98 Hz. Or 60.02 Hz. If 
time correction is in effect. Time correction is NERC guide to prevent the integrated 
frequency error (Time error of a standard electric clock) on the interconnection from 
varying by more than +/- 8 seconds [1].
Automatic Generation Control always tends to drive the ACE toward zero. High 
frequency causes ACE to go positive i.e. too much generation on the system. On the 
other hand, negative ACE means less generation than obligations and too much power is 
flowing into the system.
NERC G u id e l in e s :
National Electricity Reliability Council or NERC has established criteria for load 
following and automatic generation control. It is important to note that these are mere 
recommendations that NERC makes to the power utility companies and control areas. 
.Adhering to these recommendations is not enforced and is completely upto the power 
utility company. However in case of power failures. FERC can ask the utility companies 
to provide proof that it was following NERC recommendations when the power failure 
happened.
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A l Criteria:
The NERC guide that most directly impact AGC operation include the A1 and A2 
criteria. A1 requires that the system Area Control Error (ACE) cross zero within each 
sliding ten minute window i.e. the ACE should cross zero within ten minutes o f  last zero 
crossing at least ninety percent o f the time. This insures that no utility constantly rides 
the ties (Takes energy from the interconnected grid without scheduling or paying for it 
[8].
A2 Criteria:
The A2 criteria requires that the amount o f inadvertent energy that accumulates in 
any discrete ten minute period be less than an amount proportional to the highest ten 
minute change in the load from the previous year, at least ninety percent o f  the time [8].
T h e  C o s t  o p  A u t o m a t ic  G e n e r a t io n  C o n t r o l :
The cost fimction o f automatic generation control can be given by the following
[I]-
Cost o f  AGC = f  (Heat rate degradation. Wear and tear o f unit. Risk
exposure)................. (b)
Since some o f these quantities are hard to quantify, only the effects o f heat rate 
degradation will be looked at in this thesis. This type of approach is called Alternative 
Regulation scenarios. The process involves two steps.
1. Designating Regulating Units (Capable o f  providing AGC. Synchronized to the 
System).
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2. Block loading those units. The minimum and maximum output o f the units is 
adjusted leaving some room for the Automatic Generation Control to pick up (or 
reduce) loading.
Under some special conditions AGC might work outside the Economical Dispatch 
o f the System. These conditions can include emergency assist in case o f  unit or 
transmission line trips and other system disturbances. In these conditions AGC would 
raise the load on the fastest ramp-rate (MW / min) unit. The automatic generation 
control (AGC) controls the generation output o f  the units based on the incremental costs.
XI * PF, = Constant = System Lambda (System Incremental C o st)...................(c)
where,
XI = Incremental Cost o f Generator “I”
PF, = Penalty Factor o f  Generator “I”
5 .7. R eactive Power S u p p o rt (VAR Support):
VAR represents the relationship o f voltage and current at any point. It is a unit of 
measurement of reactive power. When the current and voltage are out of phase, the 
VARs are greater than zero. If the VARs are zero and power factor is unity, the current 
and voltage and perfectly in phase.
VARs do not flow as power flows, but are indicative o f a current-voltage phase
angle relationship at a given location. The term "VAR flow" is used to represent the
current-voltage phase angle relationship and the source o f reactive components. 
Commonly, the bus is the reference for both real and reactive power comparisons. A
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meter indicating VARs "out" would by indicative o f an inductive load with the bus (and 
contributing lines, generators and/or synchronous condensers) supplying the reactive 
component.
A meter indicating VARs “in” would be indicative of that line (and contributing 
generators, capacitors or synchronous condensers) supplying the reactive component to 
the bus (and the associated banks, load etc.)
VARs or Volt Amperes Reactive are needed on every system to support the less 
than unity power factor loads. If the loads are operating at units power factor, then there 
are no VARs required by that load. However most loads operate at less than unity power 
factor, thus increasing the need of the additional support in the form o f reactive power.
Volt Amperes Reactive (VARs) are generally provided by two sources.
S t a t i c  VAR C o m p e n s a t o r s :
Static VARs are supplied by capacitor banks on transmission and distribution 
systems. The capacitors are installed at proper distances and generally provide a constant 
source of reactive support on a system. However, due to changing demand of reactive 
support by the varying loads, there is still a need for dynamic on-line reactive power 
support.
D yn am ic  VAR S u p p o r t :
This support is provided by generators, by utilizing the generators at less than 
unity power factor. The reactive power output o f the generators is varied depending on 
the actual system requirements of reactive support.
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CHAPTER 6:
CALCULATING COSTS OF ANCILLARY SERVICES
To evaluate the cost o f  providing three ancillary services including system 
security (Reserves), automatic generation control, and reactive power support, it is 
important to study operations o f a power company. This chapter applies the principles o f 
unit commitment and power system dispatch to calculate the cost o f the three ancillary 
services. An arbitrary power company was created with the following fossil fuel 
generation stations, as shown in table 1 below.
Unit Name Fuel Type Unit ID Maximum
Capacity
Minimum
Capacity
Average 
Full load 
Fleat Rate
Nuclear # 2 Fuel Rods
" m m
Coal # 2
425 12.9730
p s i
Coal # 4
115 10.7740
260 10.5390
10.6440Gas # 2
i  Gas # 4
rev
Gas 4 15 65 13.1900
Gas # 6 6 15 65
Gas # 8 
^ e âkeFFT  
Peaker # 2 
R P ^akS W
' ' I 5 " .
Gas 8 15
Gas.
Gas
10
12
Gas 13
60
60
60
4A
55
Iso
60
"60
13.7700 I
" Z E H i Z I 3
13.7700 i 
— 1 4 3 000— n
14.0000
143000— 1
Table 1: Fossil Fuel Generators
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In addition to the above fossil fuel generation, the company also controls two 
Hydroelectric Power Generation Plants, with specifications shown in table 2 below.
Unit Name Unit ID Minimum Maximum
Capacity Capacity
Hydro # 2 23 1 500
Table 2: Hydroelectric Generation
6.1. Case # 1: Base Case:
In this case the units were economically dispatched. Based on 10% o f the 
company’s peak system load (3,500 MW), the operating reserves were set at 350 MW. 
According to NERC guidelines [8], half o f the required operating reserves had to be 
spinning (Backed down generation). That required 175 MW of spinning reserves from 
the system. The resource allocation o f different units to meet the system load is given in 
table 3 and chart 1 on the following pages.
S y st e m  D isp a t c h  An a l y s is :
The results of the system dispatch from table 3 are summarized below,
Nuclear Units:
It can be seen from the results that the Nuclear units are base loaded in the base 
case. This is expected due to efficient heat rate and low ramp rate of the Nuclear units.
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Nuclear # 1 455 455 455 455 455 455 455 455 455 455 455 455
Nuclear # 2 425 425 425 425 425 425 425 425 425 425 425 425
Coal # 1 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115
Coal # 2 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115
Coal # 3 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160
Coal # 4 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260
Purchases 674 673 640 677 674 673 674 700 700 700 700 700
G a s # l 85 85 70 81 85 85 85 70 70 70 58 50
Gas # 2 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 75
Gas # 3 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 59
Gas # 4 65 65 58 65 65 65 65 58 58 58 50 0
Gas # 5 65 65 60 65 65 65 65 60 60 60 0 0
Gas # 8 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 0
Hydro # 1 255 357 400 400 364 319 165 76 1 1 1 1 1
Hydro # 2 419 420 457 429 419 420 419 420 339 150 1 1
Gas # 6 0 0 60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Load 3318 3420 3500 3472 3427 3382 3228 .3139 2983 2795 2566 2416
Required OR 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350
Required SR 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175
Op. Res. 506 403 355 355 397 441 596 711 867 1056 1220 1249
Spin. Res. 326 223 175 175 217 261 416 531 687 876 1040 1064
Table 3 (Continued): Hourly Dispatch of Units (Base Case)
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Coal Units:
Coal units are backed down during the early morning (off-peak) hours. This is primarily 
due to availability of cheap purchase power during the off-peak hours. High cycling cost 
o f these coal units also prevent from taking the units off-line during the off-peak hours. 
Low loading conditions during the early morning hours, due to minimal air conditioning 
load and no industrial load, also causes these units to back down.
Gas Units:
Two of the gas units (Gas # 1 and Gas # 2) are kept on-line for the off-peak hours 
due to high cycling costs. The other gas units come on-line as the load increases during 
the course o f the day. The lowest point on the load curve corresponds to 6:00 am, due to 
coolest temperatures and the diminishing lighting load. The load starts picking up 
significantly after 8:00 am due to start o f office hours and industrial load.
Gas # 3 comes on-line at 8:00 am followed by Gas # 4, Gas # 5 and Gas # 8 at 
9:00 am. It can be observed that Gas # 6 and Gas # 7 were kept off-line, at this point in 
time, due to high heat rates o f these units. Gas # 6 comes on-line for only one hour. 3:00 
pm (15:00), at the peak load o f  3,500 Megawatts. As the day progresses the load 
decreases, thus decreasing the need for expensive cycleable units. Gas units are taken 
off-line as the load decreases.
H ydroelectric Units:
Hydroelectric units are kept to the minimum load during the off-peak hours of the 
morning. The units pick up load as the system load increases during the course of the 
day. The dispatch of the hydroelectric units is dictated by the price of the replacement
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purchase power at any time. The units are optimized to use during the peak purchase 
power (or generation) prices hours.
An important point to note in the operation o f the hydroelectric units is that no 
matter how these units are dispatched, the total Megawatt-hour produced during the day 
stay the same. This limit is set by the Department o f Energy (or some other non-utility 
entity) to control the flow o f water down the stream.
R e q u ir e d  a nd  A c t u a l  S y s t e m  R e s e r v e s :
Chart 2 on the following page shows the desired and actual system reserves, 
plotted along the load curve.
From the actual reserves, it is clearly seen that both Operating and Spinning 
Reserves are much higher than the desired reserves during the off-peak hours. This is due 
to the effect of cycling costs and other base loaded units. Since the base loaded units are 
kept on-line during the off-peak hours to avoid cycling costs, the actual reserves build up 
unnecessarily.
The actual reserves are equal to the required reserves at the peak of system 
load. This criteria can also be used to judge how good the system was dispatched during 
the day. Higher actual reserves during the peak (than required reserves) determines 
conservative (but uneconomical) operation of the system. Lower than required reserves, 
on the other hand, dictate an unreliable operation of the system. Both o f these conditions 
ore not desired but may happen in the actual operation of the system.
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6.2. Case # 2; Selling Operating R eserves:
To calculate the price o f providing operating reserves to some other company, the 
system had to re-dispatched to compensate for additional operating and spinning reserves.
In this case, the required operating reserves o f  the system are increased by 
100 MW (Total 450 MW). This increase in operating reserves increased the required 
spinning reserves to 225 MW (Instead of previous 175 MW). The resource allocation of 
various units and purchases to meet this added criteria was different from the base case 
and is shown in table 4 and chart 3 on the following pages.
S y st e m  D is p a t c h  A n a l y s is :
The results o f the system dispatch from table 4 are summarized below.
Nuclear Units:
In this case the Nuclear Units are still base loaded as in the base case. This shows 
that, as expected, no reserves are being supplied by the Nuclear Units.
Coal Units:
The coal units are also dispatched similar to the base case, hence providing no 
contribution to the additional reserves.
Gas Units:
Just as expected, most o f  the additional reserves are being provided by additional gas 
units. As noticed in the base case, there were plenty of extra reser\ es available
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Nuclear I 455 455 455 455 455 455 455 455 455 455 455 455
Nuclear 2 425 425 425 425 425 425 425 425 425 425 425 425
Coal 1 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115
Coal 2 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115
Coal 3 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160
Coal 4 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260
Purchases 674 655 680 652 662 682 674 700 700 700 700 700
Gas 1 85 62 50 54 58 78 85 70 70 70 58 50
Gas 2 85 85 75 79 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 75
Gas 3 85 85 56 69 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 59
Gas 4 65 51 44 50 50 65 65 58 58 58 50 0
Gas 5 65 60 54 54 60 63 65 60 60 60 0 0
Gas 8 55 55 50 51 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 0
Hydro # 1 255 357 400 400 364 319 165 76 1 1 1 :
Hydro # 2 419 420 457 429 419 420 419 420 339 150 1 1
Gas 6 0 60 54 54 59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gas 7 0 0 50 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Load 3318 3420 3500 3472 3427 3382 3228 3139 2983 2795 • 2566 2416
Required OR 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450
Required SR 225 225 225 225 225 225 225 225 225 225 225 225
Op. Res. 506 450 450 450 450 450 596 711 867 1056 1220 1249
Spin. Res. 326 270 265 269 270 270 416 531 687 876 1040 1064 1
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during the off-peak hours. During those hours the additional reserves were provided from 
the extra reserves available due to backed down generation.
During on-peak hours, the run o f Gas # 6 ( 1  Hour in Base Case) was prolonged to 
4 hours, to provide reserves to the buying company. Also another gas units. Gas # 7, was 
started for 2 hours to provide additional reserves. This change in operation o f  gas units 
during the peak hours increased the production costs o f the system during those hours.
H ydroelectric Units:
Due to the nature of the hydroelectric units, no reser\ es are contributed by these 
units to the sale o f the reserves. The dispatch o f the hydroelectric units was similar to the 
base case.
R e q u ir e d  a n d  A ctual  S y s t e m  R e s e r v e s :
Chart 4 on the following page shows the desired and actual system reserves, 
plotted along the load curve.
R e s u l t s  (B y  C om pariso n  t o  B a s e  C a s e ):
This change in the operation o f  the gas units due to additional reserve 
requirements resulted the following change in the total operating costs o f  the day.
System Operating Cost (350 MW Operating Reserves) S 1,024.352
System Operating Cost (450 MW Operating Reserves) S 1,026,209
Change in the System Operating Costs $ 1,857
Cost o f  Providing Reserv es $ 18.57 / MW - Dav
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The main reason for the low cost o f operating reserves is that the dispatch o f the 
units was changed for only 4 hours to provide the additional reserves. For other hours, 
significant extra reserves already existed on the system to compensate for the additional 
reserves.
Note that the above cost o f providing operating reserves is the break-even cost 
and does not include any privilege charges (Profits) that any company might add on to the 
costs to compensate for real-life operation (versus computer simulation). The companies 
also need to compensate for the load forecasting error, since all prices for the reserves are 
decided prior to the operation o f  the whole day.
6 .3 . Case # 3; Buying O perating R eserves:
In this case the analysis for the reserve purchases will be done. Before the 
analysis, it can be predicted that this price should be substantially less than the total cost 
o f  providing reserves. This is mainly due to the fact that cheaper resources should be 
used for local system and provide reserves to the other companies based on incremental 
units.
In this case the operating reserves for the system are reduced by 100 MW (Total 
250 MW). This increase in operating reserves increased the required spinning reserves to 
125 MW (Instead of previous 175 MW in base case).
The resource allocation o f various units and purchases to meet this added criteria 
was different from the base case and is shown in table 5 and chart 5 on the following 
pages.
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Hour 1:00 2:00 3:00 4:00 5:00 6:00 7:00 8:00 9:00 10:00 11:00 12:00
Nuclear 1 455 455 455 455 455 455 455 455 455 455 455 455
Nuclear 2 425 425 425 425 425 425 425 425 425 425 425 425
Coal 1 115 100 94 94 100 110 115 115 115 115 115 115
Coal 2 115 115 115 105 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115
Coal 3 160 110 102 94 115 145 160 160 160 160 160 160
Coal 4 260 213 155 129 219 260 260 260 260 260 260 260
Purchase 700 700 700 700 576 458 489 700 700 700 700 700
Gas 1 71 15 15 15 15 15 30 54 78 70 70 70
Gas 2 85 15 15 15 15 15 30 79 85 85 85 85
Gas 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 70 85 85 85 85
Gas 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50 58 58 58
Gas 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 60 60 60 60
Gas 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 55 55 55 55
Hydro 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 143
Hydro 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 20 237 420 420
Load 2388 2150 2078 2035 2037 2000 2081 2436 2664 2881 3069 3206
Required OR 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250
Required SR 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125
Op. Res. 1192 14.30 1502 1546 1419 1338 1288 1230 1186 969 781 644
Spin. Res. 1012 1113 1118 1128 1113 1078 1058 1049 1006 789 601 464
Table 5: Hourly Dispatch of Units (Purchasing Reserves)
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Nuclear 1 455 455 455 455 455 455 455 455 455 455 455 455
Nuclear 2 425 425 425 425 425 425 425 425 425 425 425 425
Coal 1 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115
Coal 2 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115
Coal 3 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160
Coal 4 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260
Purchase 674 673 673 673 674 673 674 700 700 700 700 700
G a sl 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 70 70 70 58 50
Gas 2 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 75
Gas 3 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 59
Gas 4 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 58 58 58 50 0
Gas 5 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 60 60 60 0 0
Gas 8 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 0
H ydro 1 255 357 400 400 364 319 165 76 1 1 1 1
Hydro 2 419 420 457 429 419 420 419 420 339 150 1 1
Load 3318 3420 3500 3472 3427 3382 3228 3139 2983 2795 2566 2416
Required OR 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250
Required SR 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125
Op. Res. 506 403 323 351 397 441 596 711 867 1056 1220 1249
Spin. Res. 326 223 143 171 217 261 416 531 687 876 1040 1064
Table 5 (Continued): Hourly Dispatch of Units (Purchasing Reserves)
CD
■ D
O
Q .
C
g
Q .
"O
CD
C/)
C/)
CD
8■D
( O '
3.3"
CD
CD■D
O
Q .
C
aO3
"O
O
CD
Q .
■D
CD
(/)
(/)
System Resource Allocation (100 MW Reserve Purchase)
R 2000
H E H E H E H E H E H E H E H E H E H E H E H E H E H E H E H E H E H E H E H E H E H E H E H E  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Time of Day
IHydro2 
ll-fydrol 
IGasS 
I(3as5 
□<8as4 
IGas3 
I C ^ 2
□  Gasl 
I Purchase
■  Coal4 
ICoal3
□  Coal2
□  Coall 
I Nuclear 2 
B Nuclear 1
Chart 5: Hourly Allocation of System Resources.
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S y s t e m  D isp a t c h  A n a l y sis:
The results o f the system dispatch from table 5 are summarized below.
N uclear Units:
In this case the Nuclear Units are still base loaded as in the base case. This shows 
that, as expected, no reserves were supplied by the Nuclear Units.
Coal Units:
The coal units in this case are dispatched slightly lower than the base case. This shows 
that some o f the reserves for ourselves was coming from the coal units.
Gas Units:
In this case the generation from the gas units was reduced. Gas # 6 was 
completely taken off-line (Instead o f one hour o f  operation in the base case). That also 
shows that the Gas # 6 was the most expensive incremental unit in the base case. This 
change in operation o f gas units during the peak hours decreased the production costs o f 
the system.
H ydroelectric Units:
The dispatch of the hydroelectric units still remained similar to the base case.
R e q u ir e d  a n d  A ctual  S y s t e m  R e s e r v e s :
Chart 6 on the following page shows the desired and actual system reserves, 
plotted along the load curve.
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R e s u l t s  (By  C o m p a r iso n  t o  t h e  B a se  C a s e ):
This change in the operation o f the gas units due to lower reserve requirements resulted 
the following change in the total operating costs o f the day.
System Operating Cost (350 MW Operating Reserves) $ 1,024,352
System Operating Cost (450 MW Operating Reserves) $ 1,023,639
Change in the System Operating Costs $ 713
Cost o f Providing Reserves $ 7 . 1 3 /  MW - Day
Just as expected, the a price that should be paid for purchasing reserves is significantly 
lower than the price the reserves could be sold at. The forecasting and other real-life operation 
constraints should still be compensated for in the final price paid for reserves.
6.4. Case # 4; A utom atic Generation Control:
Since no additional units need to be committed for the Automatic Generation Control, the 
two gas units from the base case were taken (Gas # 1 and Gas # 2) and used to provide AGC for 
an external system. These units were picked because they were run all day in the base case. 
Also, it is assiuned that these units are able to provide AGC and can be synchronized to the 
external system.
Based on the two units, the cost of providing +/- 60 MW (120 MW maximum load 
swing) of automatic generation control is to be computed. For that purpose the following 
restrictions were made to the system operation.
- 6 0  M W  L o a d  L o w e r in g :
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Gas unit U 1 : Reserved output from 45MW to 15MW for external system (30 MW)
Gas unit # 2: Reserved output from 45MW to 15MW for external system (30 MW)
+ 6 0  M W  Lo a d  I n c r e a s in g :
Gas unit # 1 : Reserved output from 55MW to 85MW for external system (30MW)
Gas unit # 2: Reserved output from 55MW to 85MW for external system (30MW)
The above restrictions on the imits will leave the units for output between 45MW and 
55MW, for the local use. These restrictions will cost in terms o f  degradation in heat rate o f the 
units as well as cycling. The cycling cost will depend on how much movement is desired by the 
other system. The AGC signal is sent every six seconds. If the units are required to move with 
almost every AGC signal, then the cycling costs will be maximized (Not very common case).
Such cycling costs o f  the units need to be determined by the contractual restrictions of 
providing AGC placed on the external system. These restrictions can dictate the cycling use of 
the units by the external company. Without such restrictions, the cycling costs will be computed 
for the worst case scenario i.e. the units are moved every six seconds to the maximum of their 
moving capacity (ramp rate per six seconds).
This case was run to provide AGC support of +/- 60 MW (120 MW maximum load 
swing). The results can then be compared to the base case. The resource allocation of various 
units and purchases to meet this added restrictions was different from the base case and is shown 
in table 6 and chart 7on the following pages.
In order to understand the reasons for the costs of providing .AGC. the operation of two 
units prox iding AGC needs to be looked at in further detail. The outputs and the incremental
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Hour H E l HE 2 HE 3 HE 4 HE 5 HE 6 HE 7 HE 8 HE 9 HE 10 HE 11 HE 12
Nuclear 1 455 455 455 455 455 455 455 455 455 455 455 455
Nuclear 2 425 425 425 425 425 425 425 425 425 425 425 425
Coal 1 115 94 90 90 100 110 115 115 115 115 115 115
Coal 2 115 115 87 60 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115
Coal 3 160 102 94 90 115 145 160 160 160 160 160 160
Coal 4 260 152 120 108 198 260 260 260 260 260 260 260
Purchases 700 700 700 700 522 383 444 700 700 700 700 695
Gas 1 50 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45
Gas 2 55 45 45 45 45 45 45 55 55 55 55 55
Gas 3 51 15 15 15 15 15 15 59 85 85 85 85
Gas 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 44 53 53 53 58
Gas 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 60 60 60 60
Gas 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 60 60 60 60
Gas 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 55 55 55 55
Hydro 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 143
Hydro 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 20 237 420 420
Load 2388 2150 2078 2035 2037 2000 2081 2436 2664 2881 3069 3206
Required OR 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350
Required SR 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175
Op. Res. 1277 1515 1587 1630 1450 1348 1328 1295 1251 1034 846 704
Spin. Res. 1088 1148 1168 1168 1143 1108 1088 1105 1061 844 656 514
Table 6: Hourly Dispatch of Units (Automatic Generation Control)
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Nuclear 2 425 425 425 425 425 425 425 425 425 425 425 425
Coal 1 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115
Coal 2 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115
Coal 3 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160
Coal 4 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260
Purchases 679 678 678 678 679 678 679 695 695 700 700 700
Gas 1 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45
Gas 2 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55
Gas 3 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 75 84
Gas 4 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 58 58 54 50 0
Gas 5 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 60 60 60 54 0
Gas 6 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 60 60 60 0 0
Gas 8 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 0
Hydro 1 255 357 400 400 364 319 165 76 1 1 1 1
Hydro 2 419 420 457 429 419 420 419 420 339 150 1 1
Load 3318 3420 3500 3472 3427 3382 3228 3139 2983 2795 2566 2416
Required OR 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350
Required SR 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175
Op. Res. 576 473 393 421 467 511 666 771 927 1120 1284 1249
Spin. Res. 386 283 203 231 277 321 476 581 737 930 1094 1059
Table 6 (Continued); Hourly Dispatch of Units (Automatic Generation Control)
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costs o f the two units and the overall system are shown in charts 8, 9, 10, and 11 on the 
following pages.
S y s t e m  D is p a t c h  An a l y s is :
The results o f the system dispatch from table 6 are summarized below.
Nuclear Units:
In this case the Nuclear Units are still base loaded as in the base case. This shows that, as 
expected, no reserves were supplied by the Nuclear Units.
Coal Units:
The coal units in this case are also dispatched similar to the base case.
Gas Units:
Due to the restrictions put on the Gas # 1 and Gas # 2 units, the dispatch of other 
gas units had to be changed to meet the internal system requirements. Gas U 6 was run 
for 14 hours (compared to one hour in the base case).
H ydroelectric Units:
The dispatch o f the hydroelectric units still remained similar to the base case. 
R e s u l t s :
This change in the operation o f the gas units due to lower reserve requirements 
resulted the following change in the total operating costs of the day.
System Operating Cost (350 MW Operating Reserves) S 1.024.352 
System Operating Cost (450 MW Operating Reserves) $ 1.031,830
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Change in the System Operating Costs $ 7,478
Cost o f Providing Reserves (per MW o f maximum swing $ 62.32 / MW - Day
It should be noticed that the cost o f providing AGC is much higher compared to 
the cost o f providing reserves. The primary reason is that additional reserves are covered 
by the already existing extra reserves during the off-peak hours. The changes in dispatch 
o f the units are only made during the peak hours, thus contributing to the additional 
system operating costs.
On the other hand, the AGC required the units to be restricted for the whole day. 
The cost of providing AGC can be significantly larger than the one calculated in this case, 
if  an additional unit is started up for the additional support.
6.5 . Costing VARs:
Calculating the cost o f VARs generated or produced is different from the previous 
two methodologies. The reason for this is that VARs are produced by installing 
Capacitor Banks (To supple static VARs) and from Power Generators (To supply 
dynamic V.A.Rs).
S t a t ic  V A R  C o m p e n s a t io n :
For static VARs, from the capacitor banks, the cost is the actual depreciation cost 
o f a capacitor bank. Capacitor banks need vety little maintenance, if any. For that 
reason, there are no operational costs. Static V.A.R compensation is needed usually on 
long transmission lines and industrial area distribution feeders. The effect of capacitor 
insertion is to improve the power factor, while decreasing the amps and VARs and
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increasing voltage for a given load condition. Voltage and power factor are increased as 
inductive reactance and impedance are reduced by adding capacitors. Distribution 
capacitors are normally shunt connected units and may be connected in delta or wye 
configuration. Shunt capacitors may be installed in substations or could be pole mounted. 
Capacitors utilized in the Extra High Voltage (EHV) transmission are generally series 
connected.
The cost o f this portion of the reactive power supply is simple calculated by the 
installation charges o f  a capacitor bank depreciated over the life o f the bank. For 
example if a pad mounted capacitor bank of 1200 KVAR has a life expectancy of 30 
years and total cost o f installation o f $20,000. Note that there might be components of 
the capacitor banks that might need replacement prior to the 30 year period. Those 
expenses will be counted as operations and maintenance expenses. For such a capacitor 
bank the cost of providing one VAR can be calculate as follows.
Cojt = ------------------- S2O000-------------------- + 0 & M = 1 . 5 ------------- + 0 & M ..............(c)
1200A1.4/? * hQYears* 265Days /1 ear KVAR -  Day
This is a over simplified calculation for the price of static VAR production. 
D yn am ic  VAR C o m p e n s a t io n :
As pre\iously discussed, dynamic V.A.R compensation is provided primarily b\ 
the generators. The need for the dynamic V.\R support is to correct the ever changing 
power factor. New motors coming on-line, or running motors coming off-line and
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drastically change the power factor for the rest of the system, if  not properly compensated 
for.
No additional fuel is needed to generate the dynamic VARs. For that reason, the 
dynamic VAR production cannot be treated as an additional operating expense. The cost 
o f producing dynamic VARs also comes from the equipment installed at the generators to 
follow and correct the power factor. Again in the case, the combined cost of all such 
equipment is depreciated over the average normal life expectancy o f  the equipment. Any 
maintenance expenses of such equipment is then added on to the depreciating value. This 
methodology covers the cost o f  installation of such equipment.
Based on various company policies, some error margin and profits might be added 
on to the combined cost o f supplying static and dynamic reactive power support.
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CHAPTER 7:
CONCLUSIONS
The cost of the three ancillary services was calculated one be one in the previous 
sections. The cost o f providing system security (Reserves) was calculated by dispatching 
the system with and without the bought and sold reserves. This methodology provided a 
true value of providing or receiving reserves. To calculate the cost o f Automatic 
Generation Control, the system was dispatched with restrictions on the ramping of the 
units providing the automatic generation control. This operation restricted the use of 
those units for the internal system use, thus raising the total operation costs. The delta 
change in operation of the restricted units provided the cost o f automatic generation 
control. The cost of volt ampere reactive or reactive power support was calculated by the 
depreciating cost of the equipment and initial invest involved.
The methodology presented above is a generalized to a arbitrary utility company. 
However, the cases of individual companies will vary depending on the corporate goals 
and shareholder policies. In the calculation of all these ancillary services, only the break­
even cost of providing these services was calculated. The whole section of Stranded 
Costs has been left on purpose, since the methodology to recover stranded costs will \a r\’ 
from company to company.
This whole concept o f un-bundling the ancillary services to create distribution, 
transmission and generation companies is still in very initial developmental stage. A lot 
o f work is presently being done in various fields to study the feasibility of any such
95
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actions. For the gas industry de-regulation, it has taken over 15 years and still there is 
some work being done to perfect the market based pricing systems.
From all the lessons learned from the gas industry de-regulation, the de-regulation 
of electric industry will be slightly faster than the gas industry. A lot o f work still 
remains to be done in the area to get to the point o f every utility’s comfort. Still, there are 
critics who strongly oppose and argue that the direction of the electric industry’s future is 
going to create worse monopolies rather than open market. They base their argument on 
the fact that the owners o f large amount o f transmission in any area can practically dictate 
the pricing in that particular area.
There are also consultants who argue that going to such market based pricing will 
make the industry unattractive for the new comers in the generation. No one will try to 
make the capital investments when they can predict that recovery o f their investment will 
be very slow if not possible. Such a mindset will create shortage o f electric energy 
capacities in the area, thus driving the price higher to make it more attracti\e for the new 
entries in the generation, transmission and distribution industries. Due to such pricing 
based on shortage of capacity, the FER.Cs original intention o f price reduction to the 
consumers will be lost.
There are also groups who suggest that the comparison of gas and electric 
industries is not only unfair but also impossible. This is mainly due to one being a 
natural resource and the othee being a generated product.
Aside from all these contrary beliefs and uncertainty among the consultants of 
electric utility industry, one thing remains the same. That is the goal to develop such a 
competitive market from which both the consumers and producers and benefit. .As far as
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the result o f the deregulation goes, it can be anyone's guess to predict the future o f  the 
industry. However, a perfect solution can only be achieved if the deregulation is 
approached with the best o f expertise and an open mind.
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( RIT EUIA 
MM'i. iEs r o ?
I U m . t \ c  c r i l c r i a  
a p p l i e s  III e a c h  
(  i i i i l r i i l  A r e a  
w i l l i l n  t h e  W S C t
th n le i w ritten  
a greem en t, the 
op era tin g  reserve  
re ip iirem en ts n l 
tw o  or m ore  
C ontrol A reas  
m ay he eom h in ed  
or  shared  o r  o n e  
C ontro l A rea m ay  
su p p ly  a portion  
o l another's  
op era tin g  reserve, 
p io v id in g  it can  
he m ade a sa ila h le  
III the re ip iiied  
liin e  and resp on se  
I ate
(3)
,SI>INNIN(.’
REQUIRED
(M W )
RESERVE
S n ilic ie n t  sp in n in g  ic se rv es  
on  A (iC  lo  p rov id e
regu la tin g  m argin  and m eet  
N lK C 's  p erlorm an ce
criteria, p ins  
sll'%, the greater o l
•  L argest e o n tin g cn ey  
(tran sm ission  or un it)
•  5%  o l  load  su p p lied  by  
h ydro  and 7%  o l  load  
su p p lied  b y  therm al
g en eration .
A t least h a lf  o f  the 5%  or 7%  
m ust be sp in n in g  and  the 
ram p rate o f  u n load ed
g eitera lion  nttisi b e cap ab le  
o f  resp on d in g  w ith in  III 
in im ités
(4)
n o w  IS I T ALLOT A TED TO THE 
( O N  TROL AREAS?
E ach C ontrol A rea m ust h ave s n ilic ie n t  
sp in n in g  reserve to p rov id e  adeip iate  
regu latin g  m argin  p lu s an ad dition a l 
am ount o f  sp in  and n on -sp in  sulV icient to 
redu ce A C E  to  zero  w ith in  III m in u tes , 
erjiial to the greater of:
•  l argest c o n tin g en cy  for that C ontro l 
A rea (tran sm ission  or gen era tion )
•  The su m  o f  5%  o f  the load  
resp o n sih ility  served  b y  hydro and  7%  
o f  the lo a d  re sp o n sib ility  serv ed  by  
therm al gen eration .
L oad  resp o n sib ility  is  d efin ed  a s  the 
sy ste m  or area lin n  load  d em an d  p lu s  
th o se  lirnt sa le s  m in u s th ose  lirm  
p urch ases for w itie li reserve cap ac ity  is 
p rov id ed  by the sup p lier
(5)
lll-MINUTE
NON-SI'INNING
RESERVE
REQUIRED
(MW)
10
II)
N o  m ore then  h a lf  
o f  the 5%  or 7%  
requirem ent m ust 
he re sp on sive  
w ith in  
m in u tes , p lu s  
ad dition al 
reserves, 
a v a ila b le  in  
m in u tes , eq u a l to  
n on -tirm  im p orts, 
p lu s
ad d ition a l
reserves,
a v a ila b le  in  II) 
m in u tes , eq u a l to  
o n  d em and  
o b lig a tio n s  to  
others
N o n -sp in  ean he 
m et by th e u se  o f  
the fo llo w in g
•  Interruptih le 
load
•  Interruptih le 
exp orts
•  O n d em an d  
rights from  
others
•  E x ce ss  sp in n in g  
reserve
•  O il' lin e  
gen eration
(6)
HOW IS 10-MINUTE 
RESERVE a l l o c a t e d  
T O  THE CONTROL  
AREAS?
S e c  co lu m n  4
N o n -sp in n in g , h a l f  o f  the  
5%  o f  7%  requ irem en t 
m u st b e  sp in n in g .
(7)
LARGEST
UNIT
REGION,
SUBREGION
IN
T h e largest  
co n tin g e n c y  
(g en era tio n  or 
tra n sm iss io n ) is  
that o f  ea c h  
C on tro l A rea  
w ith in  th e W.SC'C 
u n le ss  th e  C on tro l 
A rea s c o m b in e  or 
sh are  th e ir  reserve  
req u irem en ts
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S U B K K (; i( )N
( O .M M E N I .S
E C A H N u  cu iiiiiien ls
E u c o r t  ii iil io l A reas m ay In ltill up lo  35%  o l llie ir  reip iirem eiU  (a s  lo n g  as the total is  le ss  than 25%  o f  the I'R C O 'f requ irem en t) w ith  h ig h -se t  u n d er freq u en cy  in terru ptih le lo a d  that 
a u to in a iie a lly  ir ips at 5 9  7 11/ or a h o v e  or h ydro  ea p a e ily  a e lin g  its sy n ch ro n o u s co n d en ser  lhal can con ver t lo  gen era tin g  m o d e  w ith in  10 s e c o n d s . C o n lro l A rea s  m ay  a lso  
p urch ase up to  the greater o f  25 M W  or 25%  o f  their requirem ent from  other C ontrol A reas.
I .K C O i is in the p rocess  o l c h a n g in g  its reserve d e lin it io n s
M A A C M A A C  R eg io n  itas a ccep ted  i’JM  op era tin g  p rocedu res as appropriate b eca u se  I’JM is the o n ly  C ontro l A rea in  the reg ion  and c o v e r s  th e en tire  reg io n . A ls o , PJM  u se s  the  
term  "Primary R eserve"  for sp in n in g  and qu ick  start av a ila b le  in 10 m in u tes, and O p eratin g R eserv e  for re serve  in 31) m in u tes.
M A IN S e e  M A IN  R eserve f iu id e l in e s
M A PI* S p in  m ay he so ld  to an other M API* m em h er as e c o n o m y  en er g y , hut the hnyer m ust m ain tain  h is  o w n  sp in  p lu s  am ou nt eq u a l to  th e p u rch ase . S u c h  a s a le  is  im m e d ia te ly  
ca n ce la b le  U nd er the new  M A P I’ A greem en t, the a llo ca tio n  w ill he b ased  o n  so m eth in g  e lse ;  a  co m b in a tio n  o f  en d -u se  load  and (Irm sa le s . M A P P  u se s  an au tom ated  
p ro ce ss  ca lled  the l im erg en ey  R ep la ee in en t program  w b ieh  k eep s  track o f  M W . in tegrates hours, and p rod u ces  a tota l for th e ev e n t . (M W  o n ly , n ot S)
N P C C
S E K C
(H .O K I I ) A )
N o  f'o in m e n ts
S E R (
(S O . C O .)
N o  co m m en ts
S K R C
(T V A )
N o  co n in tcn is
S K R C
(V A C A R )
N o  co m m en ts
S P P D uring e m er g en cy  O p eratin g  C o n d itio n s, the O p eratin g  R eserve requirem ent m .iy he in creased  to the 2 largest u nits. 'I h c  O p eratin g  R eserv e  C riter ia  im p le m en ta tio n  u t iliz e s  
a d ed ica ted  co m p u te  co m m u n ica tio n s  netw ork
W .S C C V a lio n s  P ow er P o o ls  w ithin the W .St'C  h a v e  reserve  sharin g  agreem en ts that m eet the W .SCC leq u irem en ts  p in s  an y  loca l requ irem en ts.
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